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Preventing Misconduct by Promoting the Ethics of
Attorneys' Supervisory Duties
Irwin D. Miller
I. "INTRODUGrION - PUNISHING ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT
After disciplining a relatively new attorney for violating the
code of ethics, the court added this postscript to an otherwise
routine disciplinary case:
There remains.., a disturbing aspect to this case....
[T]here is evidence of concern to all attorneys.... In the fu-
ture ... this attitude of leaving new lawyers to "sink or swim"
will not be tolerated.... Had this young attorney received the
collegial support and guidance expected of supervising attor-
neys, this incident might never have occurred....
"This sorry episode points up the need for a systematic, orga-
nized routine for periodic review ......
Disciplinary opinions like this one must be particularly trou-
bling to new lawyers and law students preparing to graduate. The
young attorney who was left to "sink or swim" in this "sorry epi-
sode," sank. He was suspended from the practice of law for three
* Associate Professor, California Western School of Law. B.B.A., University of Texas,
1973; J.D., summa cum laude, University of Houston, 1977; Teaching Fellow, Stanford Law
School, 1979-80. I am grateful for the helpful comments of Professors Thomas Barton,
Marilyn Ireland, and Janet Weinstein; for the library assistance of Bill Bookheim; for the
research assistance of Holly Gordon, Scott Grossman, Mark Hannah, Kathleen Sauei, and
Georgette Trollman; for the administrative support of Sandy Murray, Mary-Ellen Norvell,
Vicky Pfeffer, and Anita Simons; and for the editorial assistance of the Notre Dame Law
Review, particularly Gina Killian. I thank my family, and especially Suzy and Lonny, for
providing the inspiration.
Indirect thanks and appreciation is also owed to the authors of a special project
which empirically showed a high consumer demand for law review articles concerning
legal ethics. Max Stier, et al., Lazo Review Usage and Suggestions for Improvement: A Survey of
Attorneys, Professors, and Judges, 44 STAN L. RLx'. 1467, 1468, 1499-1500 (1992) (finding that
in a survey of randomly selected attorneys, professors, and judges, legal ethics was one of
only three subjects that received support for greater attention in law reviews from all
three subgroups, with ethics ranking second among all subjects requested by practicing at-
torneys).
I In re Yacavino, 494 A.2d 801, 803 (NJ. 1985) (quoting In re Barry, 447 A.2d 923,
926 (N.J. 1982) (Clifford, J., dissenting)). For a more detailed discussion of Yacavino and
Bany, see infra Part II.D.
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years2 and will carry the stigma of professional discipline with him
for the remainder of his career. The supervisory attorneys in the
firm, chastised by the court for failing to give the young attorney
the "collegial support and guidance" which may have prevented
the young attorney's misconduct, went about their business of
practicing law. Describing this lack of supervision as a "disturbing
aspect" of the "sorry episode," the court issued its warning that
such a neglectful attitude toward supervisory duties would not be
tolerated in the future. In questioning whether the legal profes-
sion has heeded the court's warning, this article advocates initially
preventing attorney misconduct by promoting the ethical rules
governing the supervision of attorneys.
While the bar's ultimate goal is to prevent professional mis-
conduct, its efforts and methods to accomplish this prophylactic
goal are mostly indirect. The bar generally regulates under the
premise that disciplining individual attorneys for breaches of pro-
fessional ethics will prevent future professional misconduct by
other attorneys. In other words, at least one objective of attorney
punishment is deterrence.4 Accordingly, the disciplinary bar's'
mission of promoting a more ethical legal profession is partially
accomplished. Without such a punitive disciplinary system,6 public
2 Yacavino, 494 A.2d at 804.
3 Punishment, however, is not a stated purpose of disciplining attorneys. "As the
courts have noted, while sanctions imposed on a lawyer obviously have a punitive aspect,
nonetheless, it is not the purpose to impose . . . sanctions for punishment." STANDARDS
FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 1.1 cmt. (A.B.A. 1992) [hereinafter MODEL
SANCTIONS]. Almost all jurisdictions claim that punishment is not a purpose of profes-
sional discipline. Mary M. Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the
United States, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911, 938-39 & n.213 (1994) (citing cases which dis-
claim punishment as a purpose of discipline).
4 CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 81, 124-25 (1986). See MODEL
SANCTIONS, supra note 3, Standard 1.1 cmt. (stating that "the primary purpose is to pro-
tect the public" but noting that another purpose of imposing sanctions is to "educate
other lawyers and the public, thereby deterring unethical behavior among all members of
the profession" (citing In re Carroll, 602 P.2d 461 (Ariz. 1979); Florida Bar v. Lord, 433
So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1983); Committee on Prof. Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar
Ass'n v. Gross, 326 N.W.2d 272 (Iowa 1982))); see also Devlin, supra note 3, at 937-38
n.212 (citing cases which mention deterrence as a purpose of attorney discipline).
5 Throughout this article, unless the context indicates otherwise, the term "bar,"
"organized bar" and "disciplinary agency" refers to that agency of a state's bar responsible
for disciplining attorneys for violations of the state's ethical code of conduct. The term
"practicing bar" refers to attorney practitioners as a whole.
6 The disciplinary system has been studied several times at the national level. See,
e.g., COMMISSION ON EvALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, RE-
PORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 9 (1991) [hereinafter MCKAY REPORT]; SPECIAL
COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, PROBLEMS
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outcry against lawyers might be loud enough to mark the end of
the profession's privilege of self-regulation.
Notwithstanding the value of professional punishment, the
current process of sanctioning individual attorneys for breaches of
ethical norms can be supplemented with efforts geared directly
toward the initial prevention of attorney misconduct. The respon-
sibility of "self-regulation" of the legal profession encompasses
more than the bar's efforts at setting standards of conduct, pas-
sively receiving complaints about individual attorney violations,
imposing appropriate sanctions for ethical breaches, and hoping
that the other "regulatees" get the message and are sufficiently
deterred from engaging in similar misconduct. This largely puni-
tive approach creates an instinctively hostile regulatory climate. It
pits the disciplinary bar against (at least some members of) the
practicing bar, thereby fostering distrust and a desire to maintain
a comfortable. distance. Viewed in this way, "self-regulation" means
little more than "self-policing" with the organized bar acting out
its role as police and with individual attorneys viewing themselves
as suspects.'
Moreover, the disciplinary bar's. role remains largely passive
and reactive until it learns of professional misconduct,' at which
time the disciplinary process is triggered. The practicing bar's role
in self-regulation is similarly passive. Aside from their own respon-
sibility for complying with the ethics codes, attorneys' ethical re-
sponsibilities for their intra-firm colleagues' conduct is too limited.
By eliciting the aid of the practicing bar in preventing misconduct,
the disciplinary bar can take an important step forward. The regu-
latory framework is already in place. The notion that attorneys be
more actively involved with respect to their colleagues' ethical
conduct has been recognized by the bar, but its potential remains
unfulfilled. This recognition, embodied as an affirmative ethical
duty, imposes on attorneys a form of supervisory responsibility for
AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEFENT (1970).
7 This article advocates prevention (as a means of obviating punishment) but si-
multaneously recommends increasing disciplinary enforcement of ethics provisions aimed
at prevention which, in a sense, simply advocates more punishment. This paradox is only
superficially accurate. Disciplinary enforcement of prevention rules is initially necessary as
a means of accomplishing the end result of motivating the practicing bar to engage in
meaningful preventive efforts. Doing so then prevents misconduct which ultimately elimi-
nates the need for punishment. See also infra Part VI (recommending regulatory methods
outside of any disciplinary context).
8 WOLFRAM, supra note 4, at 100.
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their intra-firm colleagues' ethical conduct. Unfortunately, this
responsibility has received inadequate attention. Each case of pro-
fessional misconduct that is prevented' (by properly exercising
attorneys' supervisory duties) potentially means one less client
complaint to the bar,"0 one less case of client harm, and one less
attorney punished. Ultimately, instilling this sense of collective
responsibility and increased accountability makes the legal profes-
sion "self-regulating" in a more genuine and meaningful way.
The American Bar Association's (the "ABA") Model Rules of
Professional Conduct" contain an important, yet largely over-
looked rule of ethics which explicitly addresses the issue of the
intra-firm supervisory responsibilities of lawyers. 2 Model Rule 5.1
directly addresses this responsibility by imposing an affirmative and
independent duty on partners and other supervisory lawyers to
take reasonable steps designed to assure compliance with ethical
rules by the firm's attorneys." In other words, it mandates an
affirmative "duty to supervise" 4 other attorneys for their ethical
9 This article primarily deals with supervision designed to prevent instances of unin-
tentional and avoidable misconduct rather than intentional, calculated misconduct.
However, proper supervisory procedures would make it more difficult for an attorney to
engage in intentional misconduct and would assist in the detection (and correction) of
intentional misconduct at a much earlier time. Similarly, detection of unintentional mis-
conduct through supervision creates an opportunity for earlier and easier correction. See
infra note 86.
10 The sheer number of complaints is staggering. "Each year, about 110,000 people
call the State Bar [of California] to complain about California attorneys." Nancy McCar-
thy, Lawyers' Mortal Sins: The Best Way to Tick Off Clients, CAL. ST. BJ., May 1994, at 1.
11 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1993) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
12 MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Rule 5.1. There was no direct counterpart to this
duty in the predecessor Model Code of Professional Responsibility. MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1983) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. Professor Wolfram called the
absence of a general duty of supervision in the Model Code "regrettable." WOLFRAM,
supra note 4, at 882. As to the Model Code's oversight, Professors Hazard and Hodes
explain:
No disciplinary rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility even tangentially
addressed the important questions of whether and when one lawyer is responsi-
ble for overseeing the conduct of another. This deficiency resulted from the
"single lawyer, single client" assumption which animated the Code, an assump-
tion no longer comporting with modern realities and accordingly abandoned in
the Rules of Professional Conduct.
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWERING: A HANDBOOK
ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 5:101, at 765 (2d ed. 1990) [herein-
after HAZARD & HODES] (footnote omitted). See also George W. Overton, Supewising Re-
sponsibility: A New Ball Game for Law Finns and Lawyers, ILL. BJ., Sept. 1990, at 434 (not-
ing that legal ethics and disciplinary problems are treated as if all attorneys practice
alone).
13 MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Rule 5.1.
14 Model Rule 5.1 does not state the obligation as a "duty to supervise." Rather, the
[Vol. 70:2
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conduct with respect to the rules. Noting that competency is a
legal and ethical duty," supervision for ethical conduct under
Model Rule 5.1 encompasses supervising for competency. Model
Rule 5.2, a corollary to Rule 5.1, dictates the independent respon-
sibility of subordinate lawyers to comply with the rules of ethics.'6
These provisions of the Model Rules which create affirmative du-
ties directly relating to the ethical conduct of fellow attorneys
provide the ethical framework necessary to focus on prevention.
Part II looks at the recent alarm over lawyer competency and
the role of the practicing bar in supervising new attorneys. Law
practice today is increasingly conducted in firms and organizations
consisting of many attorneys, which indicates a greater need for
promoting supervision within the law firm.'7 This need is exam-
ined in the context of what has been referred to as the education-
al continuum."8 The transition from law school to basic compe-
tency to practice law is 'an important training period. 9 According-
ly, Part II reviews recently made ABA recommendations' calling
for more active involvement by the established practicing bar in
this regard.
Part III examines the rules governing supervisory duties of
attorneys in an intra-firm setting. Model Rule 5.1 addresses the
responsibility of partners and direct supervisory lawyers to make
reasonable efforts to ensure the ethical conduct of firm lawyers.2 '
Unfortunately, too little attention has been paid to this important
provision of the Model Rules' because a straightforward reading
of the Rule suggests that it was specifically designed to prevent
ethical violations from occurring.'s The bar's expectations for
concept is expressed as requiring reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyers
conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct. The terms "supervise," "duty to supervise,"
"supervisory duties," "supervisory responsibility," and similar expressions used throughout
this article refer to the affirmative obligations of reasonably assuring ethical conduct of
lawyers as set forth in Model Rule 5.1.
15 MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Rule 1.1.
16 Id. Rule 5.2. See HAzARD & HODES, supra note 12, § 5.2:101, at 778.
17 See infra note 37.
18 See infra Part II (referring to the MacCrate Report).
19 Obviously, learning to think like a lawyer does not immediately translate into
competently practicing like one.
20 See infra Part II (referring to the MacCrate Report).
21 MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Rule 5.1.
22 The American Bar Association House of Delegates formally adopted the Model
Rules in 1983. STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LA~wERS: STATUTES
AND STANDARDS, WITH RECENT SUPREME COURT AND ABA OPINIONS 3 (1994). Since 1983,
about thirty-six states have adopted some version of the Model Rules. Id.
23 In 1980, when the proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct were being
1994]
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partners and individual supervisory attorneys, to whom this Rule is
directed, can be sent through the traditional disciplinary machin-
ery. This can be accomplished simply by increasing disciplinary
enforcement of Rule 5.1 as it currently exists. In proper cases, the
bar can impose sanctions against individual partners and individual
supervising attorneys for falling to provide reasonable supervision
of subordinate attorneys in violation of the affirmative ethical duty
currently mandated in Model Rule 5.1. Stepping up enforcement
efforts in this traditional way and relying on the general deterrent
value of disciplinary sanctions, the bar can accomplish a policy of
encouraging supervision within law firms.24
Part IV examines the preventive goal from the perspective of
the supervised or subordinate lawyer.' Achieving the goal of pre-
vention should not be solely the responsibility of supervising attor-
neys. Indeed, the ultimate responsibility for ethical conduct be-
longs to the subordinate. Model Rule 5.2 suggests that the
subordinate's active role in seeking supervision becomes an indis-
pensable part of achieving the goal of prevention. Fulfilling the
relative responsibilities of both supervising and subordinate attor-
neys envisioned in Model Rules 5.1 and 5.2 can be encouraged by
the bar's explicit recognition of "Supervisory Conditions." This
regulatory approach emphasizes and fosters competency, collabora-
tion, joint ethics problem-solving, and generally heightens ethical
awareness in the practice environment.
Part V recommends a non-traditional but potentially effective
approach by which the disciplinary bar can promote this policy of
prevention in law firms. Good faith preventive efforts depend on
overall law firm policy with respect to supervisory responsibilities,
firm operating procedures, structural safeguards, and other organi-
zational oversight. Therefore, Part V recommends that the supervi-
studied and analyzed, Professor Ted Schneyer asked a simple question: "[Is Rule [5.1]
designed solely to fix responsibility for infractions once they occur, or is it a prophylactic
measure as well?" Theodore J. Schneyer, The Model Rules and Problems of Code Interpretation
and Enforcement 1980 AM. B. FOuND. RES. J. 939, 948. Some 15 years later, the question
posed by Professor Schneyer, now Chair of the Section on Professional Responsibility of
the Association of American Law Schools, has yet to be decisively answered, at least with
respect to current regulatory efforts by the bar. See infra Part VI (suggesting a method
for implementing the prophylactic purpose of the rule, since using it solely to fix disci-
plinary liability for completed misconduct is wasting a good part of the rule's potential).
24 See supra note 7 (discussing the inherent contradiction of advocating prevention
by advocating punishment).




sory responsibilities now applicable only to individual lawyers also
be directed to thela-w firm as a whole, the breach of which will
subject the firm to appropriate sanctions. Since supervision is, in
many ways, a function of firm-wide structure and policy which
transcends individual conduct, the disciplinary bar should be al-
lowed the option to proceed against the firm in instances where
the firm has failed to provide reasonable supervision.
Disciplinary enforcement against the firm involves a funda-
mental policy change in the regulation of the legal profession.
Disciplinary sanctions have traditionally been directed only against
individual attorneys for their individual ethical violations rather
than against the organization in which the attorney practices.
However, recent persuasive arguments have called for the expan-
sion of regulatory policy to allow for the imposition of professional
sanctions against the law firm as an entity.26 The influential Com-
mittee on Professional Responsibility of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York responded to these arguments by recom-
mending changes in the state's ethics rules that would permit law
firm sanctions,' potentially ushering in a radically new disciplin-
ary era.s The Committee submitted its recommendations to New
York's appellate divisions, which are studying these proposals and
are responsible for amending the state's ethics rules.' Part V dis-
cusses these recent developments and concludes that since supervi-
sory duties involve policy decisions at the firm-wide level, disciplin-
ary officials should be able to enforce sanctions against the firm,
26 See Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Frns?, 77 CORNELL L REv. 1
(1991) (advocating the expansion of disciplinary jurisdiction to cover the law firm as a
whole by analogizing professional discipline of law firms to criminal liability of organi-
zations).
Professor Schneyer, the leading proponent of law firm discipline, advocates a form
of vicarious disciplinary responsibility of the law firm for the misconduct of the firm's
lawyers. This article is not as ambitious; it advocates disciplinary responsibility of the law
firm for the misconduct of the law firm in violating a firm-directed ethical duty to pro-
vide reasonable supervision. Thus, this article does not advocate general vicarious law firm
disciplinary responsibility but urges that firm discipline be imposed as a result of the
firm's independent violation of this specific firm-directed rule. See infra Part V.
27 Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Professional Re-
sponsibility, Discipline of Law Firms 48 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 628 (1993) [hereinafter NEW
YORK REPORTI. During the preparation of the -New York- Report, the -Committee -was
chaired by Fordham University School of Law Professor Daniel Capra.
28 See Ted Schneyer, Profesional Discipline in 2050: A Look Back, 60 FORDHAM L. REv.
125, 130 (1991) (describing the new disciplinary era that eventually emerged in the "year
2000").
29 Henry J. Reske, Promoting Better Superision: N.Y. Bar Committee Recommends Ethics
Rule Changes to Permit Law Firm Sanctions, A.B. J., Oct. 1993, at 32.
1994]
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as an entity, to promote an overall policy of prevention within the
profession.
Part VI likewise departs from traditional regulatory policy in
recommending that the bar promote supervisory duties outside of
any disciplinary context.' After all, the rule contemplates affirma-
tive action on the part of attorneys to whom the rule applies inde-
pendent of any suspected or actual misconduct; therefore, the bar
should similarly assume this preventive approach. The bar's meth-
ods should not rely solely on punishing firms into supervising
their lawyers, but rather should assist firms in doing so. The bar
can avoid exacerbating an already punitive regulatory climate by
taking a much more proactive approach to furthering supervision.
Encouraging law firms to examine their supervisory roles in. ad-
vance of and with a goal of preventing problems accomplishes a
positive, prophylactic approach to lawyer regulation and
deemphasizes the usual punitive hindsight tactic.
The bar can assist firms by promulgating "Supervisory Guide-
lines" that describe some methods, procedures and techniques of
an effective law firm prevention/supervisory program. These "Su-
pervisory Guidelines" would give firms guidance and serve as a
starting benchmark for firms to conduct a self-analysis to gauge
their level of commitment to these ideals. The bar's true prophy-
lactic goals could then be accomplished by periodically requiring
firms to submit to the bar some form of a report describing their
customized supervisory/prevention program.
The ultimate purpose in increasing the disciplinary enforce-
ment of supervisory duties is to prevent misconduct. One danger
that exists in this approach is the possibility of reinforcing and
deepening a resistant "us against them" regulatory environment, at
least from the perspective of supervisory attorneys and law firms.
While subordinate attorneys are perhaps the primary and direct
beneficiaries of enhanced supervisory duties, supervisory attorneys
and law firms will also reap benefits, both tangible'1 and intangi-
30 In evaluating how great this proposal actually departs from traditional regulatory
policy, it must be borne in mind that Model Rule 5.1 does not require the occurrence
of any misconduct as a prerequisite to fulfilling supervisory duties.
31 An obvious tangible benefit from increasing supervision is the corresponding de-
crease in civil liability exposure. Under most circumstances, general principles of
partnership law and respondeat supenior would make law firms vicariously liable for the
wrongdoing of the firm's lawyers. See RONAID E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL
MALPRAcfICE §§ 5.1-5.7, at 261-84 (3d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1993); WOLFRAM, supra note 4,
at 235-37. Additionally, negligent supervision may be a basis for civil liability. See Dresser
Indus., Inc. v. Digges, No. CIV.JH-89-485, 1989 WL 139234 (D. Md. Aug. 30, 1989) (hold-
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ble.3 2 The bar's true message in promoting supervisory duties is
simply to reinforce the notion that as members of this self-regulat-
ing profession, attorneys must increase their accountability for the
ethical conduct of their fellow members. 3
II. ATTORNEY COMPETENCY AND THE ROLE OF
THE PRACTICING BAR
One frequently discussed aspect of the legal profession is
lawyer competency. This section shows that members of the prac-
ticing bar can promote attorney competency simply by fulfilling
their existing ethical duty of supervision. Perhaps the greatest
benefit the legal profession can realize from embracing supervisory
duties is a fundamental increase in the quality of legal services
rendered to clients.
Basic competence among its individual members has long
been one of the bar's goals. One approach of achieving that goal
is making competence an ethical duty, the breach of which theo-
retically subjects individual attorneys to discipline.' The success
of achieving competence through the threat of discipline is ques-
tionable.' Recognizing and acting more directly upon the under-
ing partners liable. for the misconduct of another partner, based on vicarious liability,
and based on negligence of the partners in failing to monitor the firm's billing practic-
es).
The decreasing separation between legal and ethical liability should be a motivating
development to monitor for ethical conduct. See Ann Peters, Note, The Model Rules as a
Guide for Legal Malpractice, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 609 (1993) (discussing the relationship
between violations of the Model Rules and establishing malpractice liability); Emily
Couric, The Tangled Web: When Ethical Misconduct Becomes Legal Liability, A.B.A. J., Apr.
1993, at 64; see also Schneyer, supra note 26, at 37-40 (discussing why a law firm's civil
liability exposure does not entirely eliminate the need for a system of law firm disci-
pline).
32 See Susan Bryant, Collaboration in Law Practice: A Satisying and Productive Process for
a Diverse Profession, 17 VT. L. REV. 459 (1993) (discussing some of the intangible benefits
from forming closer professional relationships in a working environment); see also At the
Breaking Point: A National Conference on the Emerging Cris* in the Quality of Lawyers' Health
and Lives - Its Impact on Law FYmns and Client Services 1991 A.BA. YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION
4, 5 (reporting attorney frustration and dissatisfaction with lack of training, feedback and
mentoring in the firm).
33 As Professor Wolfram explained:
In a law firm, professional pride, the threat of liability, fear of censure or dis-
missal by clients, and concern for high-quality legal services for clients dictate
that junior lawyers be supervised in their work.
WOLFRAM, supra note 4, at 880.
34 MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Rule 1.1. Disciplinary enforcement of competency is
limited. See WOLFRAM, supra note 4, at 190-91.
35 See Susan R. Martyn, Lauyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69
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lying reasons for incompetence are critically important. At least
one of those underlying reasons is that many newly admitted attor-
neys lack basic skills necessary for competency simply because they
are inexperienced and receive inadequate on-the-job training,
guidance and supervision. Rule 5.1 of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, requiring supervision for compliance with all the
Model Rules, includes supervision for Rule 1.1's ethical duty of
competency.' The vague and distant threat of professional disci-
pline remains a blunt attack on the problem, whereas supervision
for competency serves as a direct assault.
One major thrust of a recently completed comprehensive
study of legal education and the legal profession addressed attor-
ney competency." The ABA Section of Legal Education and Ad-
missions to the Bar created a task force to conduct the study, and
it issued its findings in a report entitled "Legal Education and
Professional Development - An Educational Continuum," (the
"MacCrate Report" for Robert MacCrate, Chair of the Task Force
and former president of the ABA).' The MacCrate Report, con-
curring with earlier studies, concluded that law school does not
fully prepare graduates for the practice of law."9 Recent debate
GEO. L.J. 705 (1981) (finding that the threat of professional discipline is generally not
effective in promoting competence); Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., To IWat Extent Can a Disci-
plinary Code Assure the ompetency of Lawyers?, 61 TEMP. L.Q. 1211, 1215-16 (1988) (noting
general agreement that the legal profession has failed to ensure its own competence
through the fear of discipline).
36 MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Rules 1.1 & 5.1. Neglect/Incompetence was the
leading cause of lawyer misconduct in 1990, accounting for 28% of the disciplinary cases.
Attorney Misconduct-Neglect is No. 1!, PROFESSIONAL LAWYER, Feb. 1992, at 9 (describing
statistics compiled in the ABA National Discipline Data Bank's 1990 Statistical Report cov-
ering the period 1986-90).
37 SECTION ON LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT - AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (Re-
port of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, 1992)
[hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT].
The MacCrate Report contains a wealth of demographic and other information
about the legal profession. By using statistics from Barbara A. Curran, The Legal Profession
in the 1980s: A Profeasion in Transition, 20 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 19 (1986) and American Bar
Foundation, Lawyer's Statistical Report (Supp. 1988), the MacCrate Report produced a
table showing, among other things, a movement in law firm size from smaller to larger
practice units and a drop in the percentage of sole practitioners. Less than one-third of
all lawyers were sole practitioners in 1988. MACCRATE REPORT, supra, at 32-33. See also
Schneyer, supra note 26, at 4-5 (noting the recent increase in the ratio of inexperienced
associates to partners indicates an increasing need for supervision).
38 Robert MacCrate, A Fresh Look at Lawyers' Education, 27 U. RICH. L REv. 21
(1992).
39 See id. at 21 & n.1 (citing prior studies primarily focusing on legal education).
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on the MacCrate Report's findings have focused on the role of law
schools in rectifring the problem. The gap between law school
and practice may narrow as some law schools implement various
MacCrate Report recommendations.' However, it would be unre-
alistic and misguided to place the full blame and burden on for-
mal legal education." Law schools cannot be expected to gradu-
ate seasoned practitioners. Furthermore, law students do not be-
lieve that they will be ready to practice immediately upon gradua-
tion.' Proficiency comes with practical experience and the prac-
ticing bar must help bridge the gap between school and practice
by providing guidance and supervision to its new members. Fulfill-
ing the existing supervisory responsibilities is a good starting point
for furthering the profession's goal of competency.
Momentum is growing for law schools to implement the find-
ings of the MacCrate Report by providing more practice orienta-
tion to legal education. At its 1994 mid-year meeting, the ABA
House of Delegates endorsed more practical training by law
40 Not surprisingly, there is disagreement as to the extent of the problem and the
willingness to take action. For example, the ABA and the National Conference of Bar
Examiners are generally opposed to regulations which dictate curriculum. MACCRATE
REPORT, supra note 37, at 275. The State Bar of California rejected a proposal requiring
bar applicants to have completed 90 hours of instruction in lawyering skills before admis-
sion. Id.
Many law schools will ignore the recommendations and make no curricular changes.
For example, Dean Stone of the University of Chicago School of Law believes most of
Chicago's law graduates will be employed in firms that will teach lawyering skills. Jane
Easter Bahls, Jump Start: A New ABA Report Suggests How Law Schools Should Prepare Students
for Practice, STUDENT LAWER, Apr. 1993, at 19-20 ("Chicago trains people who will never
go off and practice without close supervision - it would be irresponsible if they did.").
41 Lack of resources is one practical difficulty in placing the burden on law schools.
See John J. Costonis, The MacCrate Report: Of Loaves, Fshes, and the Future of American Legal
Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157 (1993). Another problem in implementing the
MacCrate Report concerns the proper and efficient allocation of functions between law
schools and the practicing bar. See Paul Brest, Plus a Change 91 MIcH. L REv. 1945,
1950-52 (1993).
Law schools' curriculum and law students' course choices must be partially attentive
to the bar examination. "The traditional bar examination does nothing to encourage law
schools to teach and law students to acquire . . . fundamental lawyering skills . ... "
MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 37, at 278. A few states (California, Colorado and Alaska)
have a performance test component to the bar examination which attempts to measure
applicants' analytical and writing skills. Id. at 280.
42 "In a recent survey of student members of the ABA General Practice Section,
only 18% of the students reported that law school adequately prepares them to practice
with little or no supervision." Bahls, supra note 40, at 19. Practitioners also know that
"[a] lawyer fresh from law school simply is not prepared for . . . day-to-day practice."
Gerry Malone & Donald S. Akins, The 10 Commandments for Training New Lauyers, A.B.A.
J., June 1984, at 58.
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schools.4' The delegates approved a report drafted by the Illinois
State Bar Association which provided a "checklist for an ideal law
school curriculum,"" purportedly derived from the MacCrate Re-
port.45 This action suggests a cure can be found by revising law
schools' curricula. However, this approach was too one-sided even
for Robert MacCrate, who told the delegates that "the Illinois bar
report overlooks the 'central message' of the MacCrate Report -
that legal educators and members of the bar are engaged in the
common enterprise of developing competent lawyers."46 MacCrate
believed that the Illinois bar report was unbalanced because it
focused primarily on the responsibilities of law schools;4' he add-
ed that "[e]ducation of lawyers must be seen as a continuum."'
His offer of a substitute amendment at the ABA mid-year meeting
failed; apparently, a majority of the delegates want law schools,
rather than the practicing bar, to be primarily responsible for
training lawyers how to practice law.49 As the profession moves
from MacCrate study to MacCrate implementation,' a great op-
portunity would be lost if the law schools are primarily targeted
for change while the practicing bar's responsibility for narrowing
the gap is overlooked.
Sharing responsibility for competency with practicing attorneys
is not shifting the burden where it does not properly belong.5
43 Richard C. Reuben, Changing Legal Education, House Endorses More Practical Training
by Law Schools, A.BA. J., Apr. 1994, at 113.
44 Ancillary Business Rule Emerges From ABA Meetings, [10 Current Reports] Laws. Man.
on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 28, 29 (Feb. 23, 1994).
45 Id.




50 Detailed analyses of the MacCrate Report and proposals for its implementation
from the varying perspectives of lawyers, educators, judges, bar examiners and others can
be found in THE MAcCRATE REPORT: BUILDING THE EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM - CONFER-
ENCE PROCEEDINGS (Joan S. Howland & William H. Lindberg eds., 1994) (collecting se-
lected presentations from a national conference on the MacCrate Report, held Sept. 30,
1993 in Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota).
51 The ethical codes have always expressed such responsibility of the practicing bar.
Prior to the clear mandate of Model Rule 5.1, Model Code provisions addressed the role
of the practicing bar in aspirational ways. Attorneys have an ethical responsibility to "as-
sist in maintaining the ... competency of the legal profession." MODEL CODE, supra note
12, Canon 1. Similarly, attorneys have a "positive obligation to aid in the continued im-
provement of ... post-admission legal education." Id. EC 1-2. Practicing attorneys can
promote competency by being positive role models for new attorneys, by maintaining
high standards of professional conduct for themselves and by encouraging such standards
in others, including partners and associates. Id. EC 1-5.
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Rather, it is sensible to convey this responsibility to supervising
attorneys. Attorneys with supervisory duties are close to the source
of problems in law practice and are directly able to influence
attorney behavior. An attorney's colleagues within his or her law
firm are major influences on a new attorney. The disciplinary bar's
vague threat of punishment for incompetence has an indirect and
detached relationship to a lawyer's daily professional activities.
Placing more responsibility on the practicing bar to assure the
basic competence of its lawyers recognizes this reality. Law firms
are in a better position than the regulating bar to teach, train and
monitor the performance of individual attorneys. Recognizing this
potential, the legal profession should promote supervisory obliga-
tions of lawyers in firms. The MacCrate Report's findings and
recommendations should not be lost on the practicing bar in a
rush to target law schools as the panacea.
The MacCrate Report identifies ten separate skills of law prac-
tice.52 Arguably, all of the skills that relate to competent law prac-
tice can best be learned and refined in the context of a practice
setting under the guidance of an experienced attorney/supervisor.
Within this context, the practicing bar can exercise its supervisory
responsibilities to fulfill its portion of the educational continuum.
In doing so, two areas of particular importance that relate to the
profession's obligations of supervision should be emphasized. Spe-
cifically, Skill No. 9, entitled "Organization and Management of
Legal Work," speaks directly and indirectly to an inexperienced
lawyer's need for supervision and guidance.53 Skill No. 9 recom-
mends that supervisory attorneys develop a system which fosters a
collaborative work environment for subordinate attorneys.' Such
Interestingly, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct for Federal Lawyers adds the
following subparagraph to its counterpart to Rule 5.1:
(c) A Federal lawyer, who is a supervisory lawyer, is responsible for ensuring that
the subordinate lawyer is properly trained and is competent to perform the
duties to which the subordinate lawyer is assigned.
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR FEDERAL LANTS Rule 5.1(c), repinted in
GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 22, at 229.
52 The ten fundamental lawyering skills identified by the MacCrate Report are: (1)
problem-solving; (2) legal analysis and reasoning; (3) legal research; (4) factual investiga-
tion; (5) communication; (6) counseling; (7) negotiation; (8) litigation and alternative
dispute-resolution procedures; (9) organization and management of legal work- and (10)
recognizing and resolving ethical dilemmas. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 37, at 135-207.
53 Id. at 199-203.
54 Id. at 201 (Skill No. 9 - Organization and Management of Legal Work). See also
Bryant, supra note 32, at 472 (finding that aitorneys' joint efforts and a collaborative
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a system should include conscientious organization and ongoing
management of an associate's legal work assignments.5 For exam-
ple, Skill No. 9 recommends that a supervising attorney, when
delegating work to an associate, convey the purpose and nature of
the task, the amount of time that should be spent on it, and the
urgency of any deadlines. 6 The supervising attorney should then
be available to give the associate guidance during the project,
monitor the associate's progress to ensure that the work is correct-
ly completed in a timely manner, and provide feedback and con-
structive criticism during and after the assignment is completed. 7
By encouraging this type of supervision and mentoring of
subordinate attorneys, the bar can better achieve its goal of com-
petence. Supervising attorneys are able to determine areas of
weakness in their subordinates. They are in the best position to
respond immediately to any weaknesses by providing constructive
criticism and instruction. They can also take appropriate and time-
ly corrective action if the circumstances so require. Since supervis-
ing attorneys are able to determine the underlying reasons for
subordinates' weaknesses, they can assist in making necessary cor-
rections. More importantly, this type of ongoing supervision pre-
vents mishaps before they occur and allows opportunities for recti-
fying any potential problems at early correctable stages.5 It re-
mains simple common sense to delegate partial responsibility for
competence to the experienced members of the practicing bar.
The MacCrate Report's recognition of supervisory skills as an es-
sential ingredient to successful law practice is a significant step
toward realizing a more competent bar.
The MacCrate Report addressed another area specifically con-
cerned with supervising for ethical conduct. Skill No. 10, entitled
"Recognizing and Resolving Ethical Dilemmas," addresses the need
to identify and solve ethical problems that arise in practice.5 9
During the course of any assignment, methods should be in place
to assist lawyers in recognizing and resolving ethical dilemmas.'
work environment are rewarded by a better work product and professional satisfaction).
55 MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 37, at 201.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 In contrast, the bar's -disciplinary process is relegated to imposing sanctions well
after the consequences of any misconduct or incompetence have occurred. See infra note
86 (discussing duty to correct consequences of misconduct).
59 MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 37, at 203-07.
60 Id. at 203-05.
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Every lawyer should become familiar with the local rules of profes-
sional conduct and "[q]uestion and research the legal propriety of
practices before employing them."61 The MacCrate Report recom-
mends that such a collaborative search to resolve ethical dilemmas
likewise applies to supervising attorneys. Despite the fact that a
supervisor has engaged in practices "long accepted by lawyers
within the particular field of practice,""2 those practices should
not continue without question. When attorneys have ethical ques-
tions, they should not only look to the rules of ethics for guid-
ance, but also seek the advice of other attorneys within the
firm.63
In addition to addressing skills necessary in law practice, the
MacCrate Report identified four fundamental values to which
every lawyer should aspire.' , One of those values targets the
profession's obligations to its newest members. Specifically, Value
No. 3, entitled "Striving to Improve the Profession," recommends
that experienced lawyers assist in the training of new lawyers.
"[T]he profession depends upon its members to assist in the en-
terprise of educating new lawyers and preparing them for prac-
tice."' Accordingly, the MacCrate Report suggests several ways ex-
perienced lawyers can assist in the development of new lawyers,
including participation in the training and support for new lawyers
in one's own law office.6'
Again, as stated by Robert MacCrate, a good part of the
MacCrate Report's fundamental message regarding the practicing
bar is that experienced practitioners must embrace their roles as
mentors, teachers and supervisors.' Training and supervision by
61 Id. at 204.
62 Id. at 205.
63 Id.
64 The four attorney values are: (1) providing competent representation; (2) striving
to promote justice, fairness and morality;, (3) striving to improve the profession; and (4)
enhancing professional self-development. Id. at 207-21.
65 Id. at 216.
66 Id. (citing MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Preamble (1993); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-2 (1983)).
67 MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 37, at 217 (citing AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, COMM'N
ON PROFESSIONALISM, "... IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE": A BLUEPRINT FOR THE
REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 38 (1986), repinted in 112 F.R.D. 243, 271-73
(1986) [hereinafter COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM] ("[A]1 [firm training programs]
should include an emphasis on professional responsibility issues.").
68 See Robert MacCrate, Preparing Lauyers to Participate Effectively in the Legal Profession,
44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 89 (1994) ("The central message of the [MacCrate Report] is that
legal educators ... and practicing lawyers ... are engaged in a common enter-
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experienced attorneys is necessary to help new lawyers "understand
what they do not know, to grasp the limited nature of their educa-
tion and background in the law,"' so that new lawyers can begin
to dispel their "paralyzing feeling of incompetence." 70 The quest
for competent and ethical law practice obviously does not end
with law school, but rather is a continuing obligation of the prac-
ticing bar.71 Since the MacCrate Report has recognized the im-
portant role of experienced attorneys in the professional develop-
ment of new attorneys, the organized bar should focus on imple-
menting the report's findings and recommendations applicable to
the practicing bar.' The existing ethical duty of supervision is an
ideal vehicle for encouraging the practicing bar to fulfill its role in
the educational continuum.
III. INTRA-FIRM SUPERVISORY DUTIES
A. General Scheme of Supervisory Duties
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.1 governs the responsi-
bilities of lawyers who, directly and indirectly, supervise other law-
prise .. ").
69 MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 37, at 217 (quoting AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE-AMER-
ICAN BAR ASS'N COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING PROF. EDUC., ENHANCING THE COMPETENCE
OF LAiWYms 75 (1981)).
70 MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 37, at 217.
71 Although it is likely that most legal educators are aware of the findings and rec-
ommendations of the MacCrate Report, it is unlikely that many practitioners are equally
informed.
72 Some transition programs do exist. The MacCrate Report did find that a variety
of programs for newly-admitted attorneys have been established in private law firms, gen-
eral counsel offices and government agencies. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 37, at 286.
Although these "on-the-job" or "in-house" programs are utilized exclusively for the mem-
bers of these organizations, they do represent meaningful developments in the training of
new lawyers. Id. at 286-87.
These "in-house" programs are likely to include many of the following aspects:
mentoring; orientation; substantive presentations; monitoring of work assignments; placing
work in transactional context; training in lawyering skills and values. Id. at 299-300. While
the MacCrate Report was generally complimentary of these types of transition programs,
the MacCrate Report had several specific criticisms regarding these programs and was
concerned whether they were adequate to meet the professional needs of many new
lawyers. Id. at 300-01. Furthermore, the MacCrate Report expressed concern for the
plight of new lawyers who are not beneficiaries of any such programs: "But if the recruits
for these legal organizations are getting needed or highly useful training, what of the
much larger number of new attorneys who begin practice . . . in offices that do not
provide such training?" Id. at 300. See also id. at 314-16 (describing in-house training
programs and noting an important element of these programs is training senior attorneys




yers.7 The rule applies to law firm partners, shareholders in a
professional corporation, lawyers who supervise in a corporate
legal department or government agency, and lawyers who have
direct supervisory authority over other lawyers within a firm.74 Al-
though the Model Code of Professional Responsibility contains no
direct counterpart to Rule 5.1, 7 common disciplinary law partially
and occasionally filled the gap by disciplining supervisory attor-
neys. However, such discipline usually occurred only in egregious
cases.7' Emerging from the decisional law was essentially an ethi-
73 Model Rule 5.3 governs supervisory responsibilities of lawyers over nonlawyer assis-
tants and "substantially parallels" the duties contained in Rule 5.1. HAZARD & HODES,
supra note 12,. § 5.3:101, at 784. The supervisory responsibilities of lawyers over
nonlawyers are not specifically addressed in this article.
74 MODEL RULEs, supra note 11, Rule 5.1 cmt.
75 ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr 446 (2d ed. 1992)
[hereinafter ANNOTATED MODEL RULES]; HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12, § 5.1:101, at
765. See supra note 12.
Although the Model Code does not state an overall supervisory obligation analogous
to Rule 5.1, it does state an obligation of a lawyer to exercise reasonable care to prevent
associates from disclosing client confidences and secrets and from making impermissible
extra-judicial statements. MODEL CODE, supra note 12, DR 4-101(D) & DR 7-107U). See
also id. Preliminary Statement ("A lawyer should ultimately be responsible for the conduct
of... associates in the course of the professional representation of the client.").
76 See, e.g., Vaughn v. State Bar of Cal., 494 P.2d 1257, 1263 (Cal. 1972) (holding
that an attorney is not responsible for every detail of office procedure, but has superviso-
ry responsibility for work of office staff); Moore v. State Bar of Cal., 396 P.2d 577, 581
(Cal. 1964) (suspending an attorney for culpable negligence in completely failing to su-
pervise an affiliated lawyer's handling of a case); In re Weinberg, 518 N.E.2d 1037, 1040
(IIl. 1988) (public censure of supervising attorney for failing to more closely supervise an
office-sharing inexperienced attorney's brief writing deadline); In re Schelly, 446 N.E.2d
236 (Ill. 1983) (failing to adequately supervise disbarred attorney working as a law clerk);
In re Weston, 442 N.E.2d 236 (Ill. 1982) (disciplining attorney for failing to adequately
supervise work delegated to associate); In re Brown, 59 N.E.2d 855, 858-59 (IIl. 1945)
(finding that a partner's knowledge of a kickback scheme warrants suspension); In re
Pollack, 536 N.Y.S.2d 437 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (attorney censured for failing to ade-
quately supervise an associate attorney regarding handling of estate funds); In re Fata, 254
N.Y.S.2d 289, 290 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964), appeal denied, 208 N.E.2d 790 (N.Y. 1969)
(holding that a partner, where a claim of ignorance was impossible to believe, has a duty
to supervise another partner's billings); In re Gladstone, 229 N.Y.S.2d 663, 666 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1962), appeal denied 187 N.E.2d 480 (N.Y. 1962) (finding attorney disciplinarily re-
sponsible for a partner's fraudulent misconduct when the attorney knew or should have
known or when it was inconceivable that he did not know, of the partner's misconduct);
In ae Neimark, 214 N.Y.S.2d 12, 13 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961) (finding that misconduct was
due to attorney's "careless reliance" on his subordinates and "lax supervision"); In re
Berlant, 328 A.2d 471, 474 (Pa. 1974) (sanctioning the supervising attorney when associ-
ate falsified contingent fee arrangement, because the court drew the inference that the
supervisor had knowledge based on all the circumstances). For a discussion of other lead-
ing cases imposing discipline on the unsupervised subordinate attorney but "warning" the
supervisory attorneys of their duties, see infra Part III.D.
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cal duty of reasonable supervision, the breach of which subjected
the negligent supervisor to professional discipline. In determining
whether the supervisor's negligent supervision warranted discipline,
the courts relied on a variety of factors, including the type and
magnitude of the subordinate's misconduct, the supervisor's objec-
tive or subjective knowledge of the subordinate's misconduct, and
the degree of the supervisor's carelessness and neglect. Although
common themes appear in the case law, the scope of supervisory
responsibility under such law appears relatively limited and narrow,
at least as compared to the ethical obligations eventually codified
in Model Rule 5.1.
Imposing an independent and affirmative duty in the Model
Rules to oversee the ethical conduct of another lawyer represents
an important change from the predecessor Model Code,"7 and an
improvement over sporadic case law development. The official
comment to Rule 5.1 explains the overall purpose of imposing
such a monitoring requirement: the "ethical atmosphere of a firm
can influence the conduct of all its members and a lawyer having
authority over the work of another may not assume that the subor-
dinate lawyer will inevitably conform to the Rules."'8
Initially, however, it must be noted that generally a lawyer is
not subject to discipline for the misconduct of another lawyer on
the basis of imputed liability. The legislative history of the Model
Rules clarified this limiting principle. Rule 5.1 was intended to
establish the principle of supervisory responsibility without introduc-
ing vicarious liability.79 Delegating work to subordinates is a prac-
77 Hazard and Hodes refer to these new duties as a "major innovation" of the Mod-
el Rules. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12, § 5:101, at 765. See supra note 12.
78 MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Rule 5.1 cmt.
79 ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra note 75, at 447 (emphasis added) (citing E.
REICH, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR
DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 153 (1987) [hereinafter Legislative His-
tory]). See Stewart v. Coffman, 748 P.2d 579 (Utah App. 1988) (noting that Rule 5.1
does not impose vicarious disciplinary responsibility on a lawyer who has not participated
in or ratified a violation of the rules). Similarly, the legislative history of Model Rule
5.1(c)(1) reflects the drafters' intent not to introduce vicarious liability concepts regard-
ing lawyers' supervisory duties. Model Rule 5.1(c)(1) provides:
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct ifi
(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct
involved.
MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Rule 5.1(c)(1) (emphasis added). The legislative history of
the Model Rules indicates that the requirement of "knowledge of specific conduct" in
Rule 5.1(c)(1) was purposefully added to avoid creating liability in courts which might
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tical matter" and Rule 5.1 does not make partners or supervisory
lawyers "guarantors of the professional conduct of their subordi-
nates."" On the other hand, this limitation does not strip the
Rule of serving its important function. Partners and other super-
visory lawyers may not "simply muddle along, relying on the
hoped-for ethical probity of their associates and just plain luck." 2
Although Rule 5.1 does not impose vicarious liability on a lawyer
who has not ratified or participated in the substantive violation of
the rules,' it does impose an "enhanced" standard of account-
ability.
8 4
This standard essentially creates independent and affirmative
duties on partners and supervisory attorneys to make reasonable
efforts to assure the ethical conduct of other lawyers in the firm.
The general rule against vicarious discipline is preserved. On the
other hand, the independent duty of reasonable supervision in
construe the word "ratify as requiring only constructive knowledge. "The amendment was
intended to remove any possibility of sfipervisory responsibility being imposed on a lawyer
who had no knowledge of specific conducL" LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 154. See infa
notes 83, 221.
80 ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra note 75, at 447 (noting that "a lawyer is not
subject to bar discipline on a theory of vicarious responsibility when there is no evidence
or finding that he should .have been aware of and guarded against a possible impropri-
ety" (citing In re Corace, 213 N.W.2d 124, 127 (Mich. 1973))).
With respect to senior lawyers assigning work and responsibility to junior lawyers,
Professor Hazard cautions: "[D~elegation is one thing, abdication is something else."
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Frm Culture Sets the Tone on Behavior, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 20, 1989, at
15, 18.
81 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12, § 5.1:101, at 769. In their first edition of THE
LAW OF LAw'ERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON'DUCr,
Professors Hazard and Hodes explain that Rule 5.1 does not impose vicarious liability on
a supervisory lawyer for the misconduct of a subordinate. They state that guaranteeing
the conduct of subordinates in this way "would be a draconian form of vicarious liabili-
ty." GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. 'ILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HAND-
BOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 454 (lst ed. 1985). Curiously,
they deleted the "draconian" description in their second edition. HAZARD & HODES, supra
note 12. See also Stephen E. Kalish, Lauyer Liability and Incorporation of the Law Firnn: A
Compromise Model Providing Lawyer-Owners with Limited Liability and Imposing Broad Vicarious
Liability on Some Lawtyer-Employees, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 590 (1987) (acknowledging draco-
nian nature of vicarious disciplinary liability, but arguing that it would not be too severe
to hold a supervisor vicariously liable in tort law for a subordinate's negligence).
82 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12, § 5.1:201, at 770.
83 Id. § 5.1:101, at 768. Lawyers who order or ratify misconduct are disciplinarily
responsible for the ordered or ratified misconduct. MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Rules
5.1(c)(1), 8.4(a). See supra note 79 (discussing the prerequisite to disciplinary responsi-
bility that the ratifying lawyer have actual knowledge, not mere constructive knowledge, of
the "ratified" misconduct).
84 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA), at 91:203. See HAZARD & HODES, supra
note 12, § 5.1:101, at 768.
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Rule 5.1 is affirmative and absolute; the failure to provide such
reasonable supervision constitutes the lawyer's own independent
violation which is the unethical conduct warranting professional
discipline. The circumstances usually found in the common disci-
plinary law cases, such as the extent of the subordinate's miscon-
duct and the supervisor's cognition,85 are not required elements
according to Model Rule 5.1's statement of supervisory responsibil-
ity.
Rule 5.1 has two separate functions. The first function, found
in Rules 5.1(a) and 5.1(b), is to establish a duty on the part of
partners (Rule 5.1(a)) and direct supervisory lawyers (Rule 5.1(b))
to make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers (in the case
of partners) and subordinate lawyers (in the case of direct supervi-
sory lawyers) abide by the Rules of Professional Conduct. Based on
a fair reading of Rule 5.1, this affirmative duty applies regardless
of the actual occurrence of any misconduct or of any knowledge
or suspicion of any misconduct. Its simple yet unmistakable pur-
pose is to prevent misconduct by requiring reasonable supervision
in some form, which might include structural safeguards, internal
monitoring or organizational oversight. This primary function of
Rule 5.1 is purely prophylactic; the secondary function of Rule 5.1
is briefly discussed in this footnote. 6
B. Indirect Supervisory Responsibility of All Partners
Rule 5.1(a) provides a general statement of supervisory duties
which applies to all partners in a firm. It reads:
A partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable
85 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
86 The purpose of the unusual practice of calling specific attention in the text to a
footnote is to illustrate by its relegation to a footnote that the second function of Rule
5.1, although important, is nonetheless ancillary to its primary function. The primary
function is prevention; its ancillary function is remedial and curative. Rule 5.1(c) (2) es-
tablishes an ethical duty to rectify the harm that has already occurred as a result of a
lawyer's misconduct if a partner or direct supervisory lawyer knows of the misconduct at
a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated. Arguably, the duty to rectify
consequences of misconduct often arises because supervision failed to prevent the miscon-
duct from occurring. The duty to remedy has been included in the general scheme of
Rule 5.1 as an ethical responsibility of partners and direct supervisory lawyers, and admit-
tedly there is some correlation between prevention and cure. Yet, since the remedial
function found in Rule 5.1(c) (2) is ancillary to prevention, its footnote status for the
purpose of sharply contrasting the two separate functions is appropriate. Prevention is
primary; cure is important, but ancillary. See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
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assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of
Professional Conduct. 7
By imposing a general duty on partners to supervise the con-
duct of the other lawyers in the firm, the rule recognizes that the
duty to prevent unethical behavior within the firm is a matter of
both direct and indirect supervision.' Since partners are indi-
rectly responsible for all legal work done in the firm,' it is not
unreasonable to impose overall responsibility for the ethical con-
duct of all lawyers in the firm. Therefore, failure to make reason-
able preventive efforts theoretically subjects every partner to pro-
fessional discipline regardless of the partner's remoteness from the
violating attorney, regardless of the partner's knowledge or suspi-
cion of any misconduct and technically, regardless of any miscon-
duct at all.90
87 MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Rule 5.1(a).
88 See Schneyer, supra note 26, at 17; see also Kathryn W. Tate, The Boundaries of
Professional Sef-Policing: Must a Law Firm Prevent and Report a Firm Member's Securities Trading
on the Basis of Client Confidences?, 40 KAN. L. REV. 807 (1992) (discussing Rule 5.1 in the
specific area of insider trading).
89 MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Rule 5.1 cmL "[E]very responsible member of the
firm shares in the firm's collective responsibility for the firm's work." WoLFRAM, supra
note 4, at 881.
90 Hazard and Hodes provide two illustrative cases, both of which describe theoret-
ical possibilities rather than enforcement reality. The first case illustrates a partner's viola-
tion of Rule 5.1(a) when the partner is remote from the violating attorney, the violation
occurs innocently, and the violation is immediately corrected. Partner L in a 3-partner,
10-associate firm, handles the firm's real estate cases and does no litigation. An associate
agrees to represent a plaintiff and files a nuisance action against C. Later, C complains
that another associate in the firm was handling a workers' compensation suit for C. The
first associate, not knowing about the conflict of interest, immediately withdrew from
handling the nuisance suit. (Model Rule 1.10(a) disqualified the first associate from han-
dling a matter directly adverse to C, a client of the firm.) Partner L knew nothing about
the associate's violation, but nevertheless was in violation of Rule 5.1(a) because the firm
as a whole had no system for avoiding conflicts of interest. All the partners, including L,
are responsible for creating such a system. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12, § 5.1:202, at
771.
The second case illustrates a partner's violation of Rule 5.1(a) in the absence of
any substantive violation of any rule of professional conduct. Partner L learns that one of
the partners in the firm had not read the Rules of Professional Conduct that had recent-
ly been adopted by the supreme court of the state where the firm practices. Although
neither Partner L nor the other partner has violated any substantive provision of the
rules, they have both violated Rule 5.1(a)'s duty to make reasonable efforts to ensure
conformance with the Rules of Professional Conduct. "At a minimum, such 'efforts' must
include a directive that all the firm's lawyers study the rules. The fact that lawyers in the
firm have otherwise obeyed the rules is a fortuitous circumstance which does not obviate
compliance with Rule 5.1(a)." Id. §§ 5.1:202, 5.1:203, at 772-772.1.
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A closer examination of Rule 5.1(a) is helpful in understand-
ing its potential scope. The Rule begins with, "[a] partner in a law
firm ... ."' All partners share the firm-wide preventive obliga-
tions." The terminology section preceding the Model Rules de-
fines a "partner" as "a member of a partnership and a shareholder
in a law firm organized as a professional corporation."93 Thus,
the general duty to have "measures" in place for ethical compli-
ance appears to apply only to partners of traditional law firms and
shareholders of professional corporations.' Heads of corporate
legal departments and governmental legal agencies are surprisingly
not included as "managing" attorneys who logically should bear
the same overall level of responsibility as do traditional law firm
partners and shareholders. Instead, the supervisory responsibilities
within corporate legal departments and governmental legal agen-
cies are those described only in Rule 5.1 (b),9" not Rule 5.1(a).
There is no rule which squarely places overall entity-wide responsi-
bility on heads of corporate legal departments or governmental
legal agencies. Furthermore, there seems to be no particular rea-
son for exempting business and government from this overall en-
tity-wide monitoring requirement.96
The term "reasonable" is an important defining element of
partners' supervisory duties. It appears twice in Rule 5.1(a): "rea-
sonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving
reasonable assurance .... "" While use of "reasonable" twice plac-
91 MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Rule 5.1(a) (emphasis added).
92 All partners are "'supervisory' lawyers per se" for purposes of Rule 5.1 (a). HAzARD
& HODES, supra note 12, § 5.1:201, at 770. Attempting to clarify any ambiguity in the use
of the words "a partner," Illinois has revised its Rule 5.1 to read that "each partner" shall
make reasonable efforts to ensure the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assur-
ance . . . ." Overton, supra note 12, at 435.
93 MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Terminology [6]. A "law firm," however, is defined
as "a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, lawyers employed in the legal department of a
corporation or other organization and lawyers employed in a legal services organization."
Id. Terminology [3]. The fact that the definition of a "law firm" includes in-house corpo-
rate lawyers adds to the ambiguity regarding the coverage of Rule 5.1(a). See infra notes
115-18 and accompanying text.
94 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12, § 5.1:201, at 770. See infra notes 115-18 and
accompanying text.
95 Rule 5.1(b) describes the supervisory responsibilities of lawyers (partner or non-
partner) with direct supervisory authority over another lawyer. See infra Part 1.C.
96 Professor Wolfram describes Rule 5.1(a)'s exclusion of senior lawyers in corporate
general counsel offices and government legal offices as unfortunate. WOLFRAM, supra note
4, at 882 n.25. For further discussion of the coverage of Rule 5.1, see infra notes 115-18
and accompanying text.
97 MODEL RULEs, supra note 11, Rule 5.1(a) (emphasis added).
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es even greater uncertainty on what efforts are to be made and
what level of assurance is required, the term clarifies that Rule
5.1(a) was never intended to make partners guarantors of
subordinates' professional conduct.98 Exactly what constitutes "rea-
sonable efforts" or "reasonable assurance" within the meaning of
Rule 5.1(a) "can depend on the firm's structure and the nature of
its practice,"" and "can take many forms, so long as they are rea-
sonably calculated to eliminate or inhibit violations.""°° Whereas
informal supervision may suffice in a small firm, a larger firm may
require more formalized supervisory procedures.101 If the nature
of the practice involves difficult ethical problems, even more exact-
ing supervision may be "reasonably" necessary. Reasonable efforts
might include continuing legal education in professional eth-
ics,02 implementing a system for anonymous referral of ethical
problems to a special committee,0" and instituting office proce-
dures for surfacing and solving ethical problems. °' Whatever rea-
sonable measures are eventually instituted, they should be directed
to all the lawyers in the firm, associates and partners alike. 5
The last element of Rule 5.1(a) refers to reasonable efforts
toward compliance with "the Rules of Professional Conduct,""°
which obviously includes all of the Rules. The ethical duty of com-
98 A partner must only make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has the
measures in place. An individual partner who makes "reasonable" yet unsuccessful efforts
may not be in violation of Rule 5.1(a), even though the firm has no measures in place.
Generally, "reasonable," when used in reference to attorney conduct denotes the
conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer. MODEL RULES, supra note 11,
Terminology [7].
99 Id. Rule 5.1 cmL
100 HAzARD & HODES, supra note 12, § 5.1:201, at 770.
101 MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Rule 5.1 cmt.
102 Id.
103 Id. See COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 67, at 273 n.82 (suggesting
that Rule 5.1 actually requires in-house ethics committees); Jonathan M. Epstein, Note,
The In-House Ethics Advisor Practical Benefits for the Modern Law Fim, 7 GEo. J. LEGAL ETH-
ICS 1011 (1994) (noting that, although not required by Rule 5.1, valuable benefits are
realized by in-house ethics committees).
104 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12, § 5.1:101, at 769 (describing the requirement as
"in general, the creation of an atmosphere of attention to matters of professional eth-
ics"). See also Spaeth, supra note 35, at 1233 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 5.1(a) (1993) as requiring that lawyers "maintain a continuing, general
situation... in which there will always be 'in effect measures giving reasonable
assurance' that all lawyers in the firm . . . will act in conformity with the rules.").
105 See, e.g., Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Digges, No. CIV.JH-89-485, 1989 WL 139234 (D.
Md. Aug. 30, 1989) (basing partners' civil liability for the misconduct of another partner
on vicarious liability and on negligence in failing to monitor the firm's billing practices).
106 MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Rule 5.1(a).
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petence is of particular importance because it may be overlooked
as merely a matter of potential malpractice, not ethics.07 Model
Rule 1.1 provides that a lawyer shall provide competent represen-
tation, which "requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."108
Competency, as a matter of professional ethics, deserves special
attention in the area of supervision because of the likelihood that
a subordinate attorney will be inexperienced, and may not be
capable of independently carrying out the matters delegated to
him or her."° It may be difficult and awkward for subordinates
to confess to supervisors that they need help in performing certain
legal tasks."' Therefore, the obligations of a partner under Rule
5.1(a) require efforts to institute measures that reasonably assure
the basic competency of all legal work done by lawyers in the
firm."' Although supervision for competent representation would
normally occur at the level of direct supervisor/associate, partners'
obligations under Rule 5.1(a) would be to institutionalize proce-
dures and policies that mandate reasonable ongoing supervision.
Regardless of the Rule's form, coverage or clarity, the inten-
tion and ultimate purpose of the Rule is obvious. Unmistakably,
Rule 5.1(a) is designed to affirmatively motivate partners to in-
stitute policies and safeguards at the firm-wide level that reason-
ably assure ethical conduct by all attorneys in the firm."' The
implemented safeguards and procedures need not actually guaran-
tee conformance, but should constitute reasonable measures de-
signed to prevent misconduct and promote ethical conduct at the
firm-wide level.
C. Direct Responsibility of Supervisory Attorneys
While Rule 5.1(a) establishes the general supervisory responsi-
bility of partners for firm-wide ethical conduct, Rule 5.1(b) estab-
lishes a similar duty for any lawyer having direct supervisory au-
thority over any other lawyer. It reads:
107 Id. Rule 1.1. See supra Part II.
108 MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Rule 1.1.
109 See supra Part II.
110 See infra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
111 "Supervisors . . . are required to supervise the junior lawyers' compliance with
ethical standards as well as their professional performance." HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12,
§ 5.1:101, at 769 (emphasis added). See supra note 51.
112 See Schneyer, supra note 26, at 8 (noting that the firm's organization, policies and
procedures constitute the ethical infrastructure of the firm).
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A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other
lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct."3
Rule 5.1(b) applies to partners (but 6nly with respect to direct
subordinates) and non-partners who have direct supervisory au-
thority over other lawyers. Any lawyer who delegates responsibility
to subordinates must provide reasonable supervision of those sub-
ordinates."'
Although the Rule itself carefully distinguishes between the
duties of a partner in Rule 5.1 (a) and the duties of a direct super-
visory lawyer in Rule 5.1(b), the official comment to Rule 5.1
seems to obliterate any distinction between paragraphs (a) and (b)
by discussing them together:
Paragraphs (a) and (b) refer to lawyers who have supervisory
authority over the professional work of a firm or legal depart-
ment of a government agency. This includes members of a
partnership and the shareholders of a law firm organized as a
professional corporation; lawyers having supervisory authority in
the law department of an enterprise or government agency;
and lawyers who have intermediate managerial responsibilities
in a firm."-
The official comment confuses rather than clarifies.," Neverthe-
less, the legislative history of the Model Rules indicates that there
is a distinction, noting that Rule 5.1(a) was intended to address
the duty of a partner while "paragraph (b) applied to a non-part-
ner in a firm and to a lawyer in an organization that was not a
partnership, such as the law department of a corporation.""" As
noted, only partners and shareholders of traditional law firms
appear to have firm-wide supervisory duties under Rule 5.1(a)-;
their counterparts in business and government have no such gen-
113 MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Rule 5.1(b). Whether a lawyer has supervisory au-
thority over another lawyer is a question of fact. Id. cmt.
114 See supra note 76.
115 MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Rule 5.1 cmt.
116 Similarly, the discussion regarding reasonable efforts mandated in Rule 5.1(a) and
Rule 5.1(b) was merged in the official comment to the Rule: "It]he measures required
to fulfill the responsibility prescribed in paragraphs (a) and (b) ... ." MODEL RULES,
supra note 11, Rule 5.1 cmt. Presumably, there is a difference between a partner's efforts
to fulfill Rule 5.1(a) and a direct supervisory lawyer's efforts to fulfill 5.1(b). See supra
notes 97-112 and accompanying text; infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
117 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 79, at 154. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12,
§ 5.1:301, at 773.
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eral duty. This distinction makes little sense. -Recognizing that the
need to supervise for ethical conduct is a matter of entity-wide
indirect responsibility, the general duty in Rule 5.1(a) represents
good policy for traditional law firms and should apply similarly in
legal departments of government and business."'
Other distinctions between Rules 5.1(a) and 5.1(b) concern
the scope of responsibility and the extent of ongoing efforts.
These distinctions make practical sense. Each partner is respon-
sible for instituting firm-wide measures for all attorneys in the
firm, including co-partners. Once reasonable measures are in
place, the partner's ongoing obligations under Rule 5.1(a) argu-
ably would be limited to checking periodically that the measures
promoting ethical conduct are working reasonably well. Presum-
ably, these measures operate to provide reasonable assurance of
ethical compliance. The duty to institute these measures applies
based on partner status, without regard to the existence of any
direct supervisory relationship or actual authority over any lawyers
in the firm. The duty to implement properly these partner-insti-
tuted measures rightfully falls on those attorneys with direct super-
visory authority.
A direct supervisory lawyer is responsible under Rule 5.1(b)
for reasonable ongoing efforts to ensure the ethical conduct of his
or her direct subordinates, but is not responsible for instituting
measures for the firm as a whole. In addition, a direct supervisory
lawyer, unlike a partner,"9 is only concerned with attorneys di-
rectly under his or her control, and is not responsible for ensur-
ing professional conduct of attorneys outside of this direct supervi-
sor/subordinate relationship. Requiring general measures exclusive-
ly from partners is appropriate. Rarely will a non-partner be in a
118 Mary Daly, Fordham University School of Law Professor and Director of the Stein
Institute of Law and Ethics, noted the apparent contradiction between the text of Rule
5.1 and the official comment and acknowledged that "at first glance" and "on its face,"
Rule 5.1(a) excludes in-house counsel. Mary C. Daly, Ethical Challenges for Law Departments
in the Twenty-First Century, in SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON CORPORATE LAW DEPARTMENT
MANAGEMENT: CONTROLLING AND REDUCING COSTS (PLI Corporate Law and Practice
Course Handbook Series No. B4-7046, 1993). Professor Daly believes, based on the intent
of the drafters of the Model Rules to establish an organizational check on lawyers' ethics,
in-house counsel would be included in the coverage of Rule 5.1(a). Id. at 2-3. "It is im-
possible to imagine a valid reason for exempting in-house counsel from the reach of
[Model Rule 5.1(a)]." Id. at 3 (also discussing which in-house counsel positions would be
analogous to a partner for purposes of Rule 5.1(a)).
119 However, a partner can obviously be both a partner to whom Rule 5.1(a) applies
as well as a direct supervisory lawyer to whom Rule 5.1(b) applies (with respect to the
partner's direct subordinates). See HAzARD & HODES, supra note 12, § 5.1:101, at 769.
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position to effect general firm-wide measures addressing potential
issues of professional responsibility.2 ' While it makes sense to
hold direct supervisory lawyers responsible for ongoing efforts to
monitor their direct subordinates, it would be inappropriate to
expect him or her to establish firm-wide meas ures.
As indicated earlier, distinctions in the letter of the Rule are
not as important as the spirit of the Rule. The spirit is prevention
of attorney misconduct through reasonable supervision and the
bar needs to send this message more clearly in varying ways. The
question of whether that message has been sent through disciplin-
ary cases remains somewhat uncertain.
D. Enforcement Against Individual Supervisory Attorneys
The effectiveness of Rule 5.1 in preventing misconduct de-
pends upon the importance attributed to the Rule by partners and
individual supervisory attorneys12' and their good faith attempts
to comply with the Rule's intended purpose. Individual supervisory
attorneys will increase their (supervisory) efforts if the bar imposes
appropriate sanctions for failing to provide the required level of
reasonable supervision. This section examines whether the bar has
sent that message through its traditional disciplinary machinery in
cases involving lack of supervision. This section concludes that the
lack of disciplinary cases actually enforcing the requirements of
these mandatory supervisory rules evidences a regrettable neglect
and recommends that disciplinary efforts increase.
Underenforcement cannot be explained by the lack of oppor-
tunity to examine supervisory duties in a disciplinary context. Ar-
guably, every case of professional discipline, other than cases
against sole practitioners, raises the question of whether reason-
able (preventive) measures (Rule 5.1 (a)) were in effect and wheth-
er reasonable (preventive) efforts (Rule 5.1(b)) were made. The
fundamental policy question of prevention is raised frequently
enough to have generated more disciplinary case discussion.
12
The relative handful of disciplinary cases disapproving of blatant
120 Cf Danny P. Richey, Guidelines and Techniques for Leading and Managing the Liti-,
gation Team, 19 OHIo N.U. L REv. 23, 48-50 (1992) (discussing, in a litigation team set-
ting, the differences between delegating (assigning tasks and authority to others) and su-
pervising (insuring that work is handled correctly by others)).
121 See infra Part V (discussing enforcement against the law firm as a whole).
122 But see Schneyer, supra note 26, at 6-8 (discussing the infrequency of disciplinary
actions against large and medium-sized firms and analyzing possible explanations).
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lack of supervisory efforts12 is not the kind of strong message
that should be sent considering the great value to be gained by
preventing misconduct through supervision.
This section will use a recent event as a vehicle for showing
the current state of disciplinary enforcement of Rule 5.1. Con-
stance Vecchione, assistant Massachusetts bar counsel, recently
stated at a meeting of the National Organization of Bar Counsel
that the bar has enforced Rule 5.1.124 Ms. Vecchione was instruct-
ing fellow bar counsel on ethics rules and case law "that can
help ... make disciplinary cases stick against... senior attor-
neys"125 and stated that attorneys in law firms truly are their
"'brother's [and sister's] keeper[s].'"126 Implying that preventing
misconduct is an important goal, she indicated that "[e]ven in
cases where there is no knowledge of developing problems, the re-
sponsibilfty of the supervising lawyer has been seen as abso-
lute." "l Expressing her belief that the supervisory duties under
Rule 5.1 (and related duties under Model Rules 5.2 and 5.3) have
been enforced, she supported her conclusion by citing three disci-
plinary cases: In re Barry, 1 8  In re Yacavino,1 and In re
Weston. s
Ms. Vecchione's audience consisted primarily of bar counsel
responsible for enforcement of states' ethics rules. Therefore,
these cases are examined here to determine whether disciplinary
agencies are, in fact, adequately armed with precedent for the
future enforcement of Rule 5.1. Also, examining the details of a
few cases in which lack of supervision contributed to professional
misconduct shows the value of prevention within a factual context.
While these three cases suggest that some attention has been giv-
en to supervision in disciplinary cases, interpreting them as indica-
tive of the bar's commitment to vigorous enforcement of Rule 5.1
against supervisory attorneys is overly optimistic. These cases are
not the only disciplinary opinions concerning supervisory duties.
Nonetheless, combining these cases with others still fails to show
123 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
124 "Nazi Defense" Won't Work, Bar Counsel Tells NOBC [6 Current Reports] Laws. Man.




128 447 A.2d 923 (NJ. 1982).
129 494 A.2d 801 (NJ. 1985).
130 442 N.E.2d 236 (Ill. 1982).
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that the ethical duty of supervision has received the attention that
it deserves.'
The first case, In re Barry, involved a disciplinary action against
an associate who handled a significant number of matters in a
grossly negligent manner. 2 Although the court concluded that
the associate lacked an intent to defraud, 3 and that he made
full disclosure and cooperated completely in resolving the clients'
matters, the court suspended him for three months.s Upon
discovering the problem, the firm immediately expedited the cases
or settled with clients whose matters had been neglected; in so
doing, no client sustained pecuniary loss. 5
Although the court acknowledged that the law firm's lack of
supervision over its associate contributed to the misconduct, it did
not seriously criticize the firm.ss The court said:
We are not unmindful of nor insensitive to the stressful work
conditions in which respondent found himself. The record
once again raises the problem of what can happen to younger
lawyers in thriving firms who are given important responsibili-
ties in recognition of their demonstrated abilities. Sometimes
the demands of those responsibilities are beyond the lawyer's
capacity. Natural talent is no substitute for years of practice
and the crucible of experience. Respondent does not seek to
place on his employers the blame for his quandary, nor would
this record satisfy us that it should be laid there.' 7 But the
problem remains, and we trust that the bar shares our concern
that newly admitted attorneys in a law firm should be given
131 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. Not only the disciplinary bar, but the
practitioner leaders of the profession also need to examine their own efforts to comply,
with Rule 5.1.
As the leaders of the profession contemplate improvement of professionalism,
they should address whether Rule 5.1 is being observed as it should be. At the
very least, they should make sure that it is being observed within their own
firms and law departments.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Ethics, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 17, 1994, at 15, 16.
132 Bany, 447 A.2d at 925.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 926.
135 Id. at 924. By taking this "corrective action," the firm fulfilled its duty under Rule
5.1(c) (2) to mitigate consequences of misconduct. See supra note 86.
136 Id. Bany was decided under the Model Code when supervisory duties as set forth
in the Model Rules had not yet been established. Thus, any supervisory responsibility of
intra-firm attorneys was a matter of common (disciplinary) law.
137 The subordinate attorney remains fully accountable for the misconduct, and lack
of supervision, standing alone, will generally not mitigate the sanction. See infra Part IV.
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guidance and supervision by their senior colleagues."s
In contrast, the dissenting opinion placed less blame on the re-
spondent and placed more responsibility on the principals of the
law firm to have prevented the misconduct:
The conclusion is inescapable that a considerable measure
of blame for respondent's predicament must fall on the shoul-
ders of the principals in the law firm that employed him, even
though he does not seek to place it there .... [The] respon-
dent "was given numerous files to handle with little or no guid-
ance." It is simply inexcusable to impose on a fledgling lawyer
the total responsibility for clients' affairs without some regular
supervision. It is not enough that the principals be available if need-
ed. This sorry episode points up the need for a systematic,
organized routine for periodic review of a newly admitted
attorney's files. The "sink or swim" approach is ill-suited to a
high volume professional operation.3 9
As signaling serious enforcement of Model Rule 5.1, Bary's
precedential value is limited: (1) the case was a disciplinary action
against the wrongdoing, unsupervised, subordinate attorney, and
not a disciplinary action against any of the firm's attorneys for fail-
ing to supervise; (2) the majority opinion, while mildly critical of
the law firm's unsupervised practice environment, explicitly placed
no blame on the firm for the respondent's misconduct; (3) the
harsher criticism of the principals of the law firm for disregarding
supervisory duties was in the dissenting opinion; and (4) the case
was not an interpretation of Rule 5.1. While Barry (particularly the
dissenting opinion) should cause principals in law firms to consid-
er their supervisory duties, interpreting it as strong authority for
the proposition of imposing sanctions on neglectful supervisory
attorneys is not entirely accurate.
The second case, In re Yacavino,'4° was also a decision by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in a disciplinary action against the
unsupervised, subordinate attorney. In Yacavino, a relatively new
attorney of a twenty lawyer firm was "left virtually alone and unsu-
pervised" 14' in one of the firm's branch offices. He received a
three year suspension for forging a court order to conceal his neg-
138 Bary, 447 A.2d at 925.
139 Id. at 926 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). According to the dissent,
merely being available, if needed, does not satisfy a reasonable supervision standard,
which suggests that supervision is a proactive and ongoing process.
140 494 A.2d 801 (NJ. 1985).
141 Id. at 803.
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ligent handling of an adoption." Yacavino, as a typical disciplin-
ary opinion, recited the specific acts of attorney misconduct, iden-
tified the violated code sections and imposed an appropriately
harsh sanction. To its credit, the court was moved to look beyond
Yacavino's misconduct and examine other circumstances that may
have contributed to his unethical behavior. Indeed, the court re-
called the warning it issued just three years earlier in the dissent-
ing opinion in Barry regarding lack of supervision by a law firm's
principals:
There remains, however, a disturbing aspect to this case that
must be mentioned. Without mitigating respondent's fault,"
there is evidence of concern to all attorneys involved in the
episode. According to his testimony, respondent was left virtu-
ally alone and unsupervised.... The office was lacking in the
essential tools of legal practice. Partners rarely attended the
office; no member of the firm inquired as to the status of the
office matters.... In the future, however, this attitude of leav-
ing new lawyers to "sink or swim" will not be tolerated. Had
this young attorney received the collegial support and guidance
expected of supervising attorneys, this incident might never have
occurred. . . . "This sorry episode points up the need for a sys-
tematic, organized routine for periodic review of a newly admit-
ted attorney's files."144
As in the dissenting opinion in Barry, the court in Yacavino
was quite disturbed by the law firm's callous disregard of its super-
visory duties. Its warning to firms that the "sink or swim" attitude
toward new lawyers would not be tolerated in the future is defi-
nitely a promising development. Nevertheless, the fact remains
that the attorney sanctioned in Yacavino, as in Barry, was the unsu-
pervised, subordinate attorney, not the neglectful supervisor(s)..
Although the principals of the firm were warned and seriously
criticized, no one was sanctioned or disciplined for failing to su-
pervise the respondent."4 Consequently, both Barry and Yacavino
142 Id. at 801-02.
143 Unsupervised, subordinate attorneys should again take note that they remain re-
sponsible for their misconduct. As the court pointed out, the fact that lack of supervision
caused or contributed to the misconduct will generally not be considered as a mitigating
factor in a disciplinary proceeding against the subordinate. See infra Part TV.
144 Yacavino, 494 A.2d at 803 (quoting In re Barry, 447 A.2d 923, 926 (NJ. 1982)
(Clifford, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)). The court observed the ultimate value of su-
pervision by speculating that the incident might never have occurred had there been
proper supervision. This article began with edited portions of this passage. See supra note
1 and accompanying text.
145 In addressing the fact that no disciplinary charges were filed in Yacavino against
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should be much more troubling, from a disciplinary standpoint, to
unsupervised, subordinate attorneys than to the supervisory princi-
pals of law firms. Barry and Yacavino are, at best, indirect sources
of authority for disciplinary efforts aimed at enforcing supervisory
duties against attorneys responsible for supervising.
Although Yacavino was decided under the Model Code, " 6 by
the time the court's decision was rendered, New Jersey had adopt-
ed the Model Rules. Prospectively armed with the codified version
of supervisory duties expressed as an affirmative ethical obligation
in Model Rule 5.1, the court's (future) wake-up call to supervising
attorneys should ring even louder:
Our Rules of Professional Conduct now make clear the ethical
responsibility of a supervising attorney to take reasonable ef-
forts to ensure "that all lawyers [in the organization] conform
to the Rules of Professional Conduct." Under that Rule it is
the supervising attorney's responsibility to assure that each
lawyer in the organization diligently carries out the firm's con-
tracts of employment with clients. "7
Thus, although Yacavino does not stand as direct authority for
enforcement of supervisory duties against supervising attorneys, it
undoubtedly advocates such thought and represents future disci-
plinary policy."
any partner for failing to supervise, Professor Schneyer explains that no partner was spe-
cifically in charge of the case that attorney Yacavino neglected. "The problem was not
that someone given the task of monitoring Yacavino did it poorly, rather, the firm had
failed to give anyone the task." Schneyer, supra note 26, at 19.
146 Yacavino, 494 A.2d at 803.
147 Id. at 803-04 (citation omitted).
148 On the other hand, four years after Yacavino's stern warning to supervisory attor-
neys, the New Jersey Supreme Court had the opportunity to show that it meant what it
said. The court suspended a supervised attorney for misrepresenting the status of a
client's estate matter. The attorney was assigned to an area of law in which he "did not
move with complete ease or confidence." Although better than ignoring altogether the
unsupervised practice setting, the court merely issued yet another warning:
We wish not to be unfair to the firm . . . . For today's purposes it is sufficient
that we express our sense of unease over the extent to which the supervising
firm carried out its end of the arrangement. [The attorney was previously or-
dered to practice in a supervised setting.] The occasion affords us the oppor-
tunity to remind the bar that when lawyers take on the significant burdens of
overseeing the work of other lawyers, more is required than that the supervisor
simply be "available."
In re Ritger, 556 A.2d 1201, 1203 (N.J. 1989) (citing In re Barry, 447 A.2d 923 (N.J.
1982) (Clifford, J., dissenting)). Curiously, the Ritger court did not even mention Yacavino




The third case, In re Weston,'49 most closely stands for the
proposition that a supervisory attorney has disciplinary responsibil-
ity for failing to supervise an associate attorney. In Weston, the bar
disciplined a neglectful supervisory attorney who served as the
administrator of an estate.150 Instead of handling the matter him-
self, he assigned it to an associate whom he considered to be com-
petent.'51 However, the associate neglected the assignment for
many years, thereby causing financial losses to the client. Unlike
Barry and Yacavino, Weston was actually a disciplinary action against
the delegating and would-be supervising attorney. 52
The attorney's proposed defense5 . to disciplinary charges
was that he was unaware of his associate's neglect. He argued that,
although he may be responsible for the financial losses that oc-
curred, he should not be "personally or ethically responsible " 4M
for his associate's misconduct. The court rejected his defense that
it was his associate who had committed the violations:
"Respondent's contention that his duties and extensive travels...
left him little time to supervise the attorneys in his office is not
persuasive."' Further, the court concluded that "an attorney
cannot avoid his professional obligations to a client by the simple
device of delegating the work to others,"5 6 and explained that
"[a] lawyer's primary obligation is to ... clients, and neither [oth-
er] duties nor a belief in the competency of subordinates is suffi-
cient to justify inadequate supervision, particularly after knowledge of
the existence of problems is acquired." '57
As stated earlier, Weston comes close to standing for the prin-
ciple that a supervisory attorney has disciplinary responsibility for
failing to supervise the conduct of a subordinate attorney. Howev-
er, the court somewhat diluted the impact of the case by discuss-
ing the respondent attorney's own misconduct (apart from his
149 442 N.E.2d 236 (Il. 1982).
150 Id. at 237.
151 Id. at 238.
152 Id. at 237.
153 The attorney originally did not respond to the disciplinary complaint against him.
Later, he requested a remand to consider the charges in light of his defense. The court
refused his request to remand for a hearing but discussed his "proposed" defense. Id. at
238-39.
154 Id. at 238.
155 Id. at 239.
156 Id. at 239 (quoting In re Ashbach, 150 N.E.2d 119 (Ill. 1958)).
157 Id. (emphasis added). This should not be interpreted as imposing any knowledge
requirement as a prerequisite to the duty of supervision under Rule 5.1.
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supervisory failures) in neglecting the client's matter after he was
aware his associate had mishandled the matter. Weston noted that
the probate court had previously ordered the supervising attorney
to appear and when he did not, removed him as administrator of
the estate. The supervisory attorney knew that his associate was not
properly administering the estate. Had the supervisor acted in a
timely manner, a major part of the financial loss could have been
avoided."S In other words, the court's imposition of sanctions
was based, in part, on the supervisor's own professional miscon-
duct which occurred after he realized that his associate was ne-
glecting the client's matter.
Weston was not disciplined solely for failing to provide reason-
able supervision even though much of the court's discussion did
center on this deficiency. Indeed, the case was decided under the
Model Code which contained no counterpart to Model Rule
5." These factors partially diminish Weston's precedential value
as support for disciplining attorneys solely for lack of supervision.
Although these cases indicate a trend toward enforcement of
the duty to supervise, their direct precedential value is limited.
Furthermore, a more serious problem is that this smattering of
cases (even in combination with others) spanning years of experi-
ence with the Model Rules is not the kind of strong statement
that could be and should be forthcoming from the disciplinary.
bar. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, Ms. Vecchione's sugges-
tions to bar counsel regarding disciplinary enforcement of supervi-
sory duties is an important step forward, and shows that the bar is
moving in the right direction (prevention).
Since disciplinary actions against individual partners and su-
pervisory attorneys for failing to supervise within the meaning of
Rule 5.1 are not plentiful, it is important to examine reasons
which might explain the scarcity of disciplinary cases addressing
supervision. Imposing disciplinary sanctions against individual attor-
neys for failing to supervise subordinate attorneys may simply be
an unrealistically difficult undertaking. While disciplinary officials
may be comfortable imposing sanctions for acts of commission
which violate ethics rules, they may be hesitant to discipline attor-
158 In this sense, the attorney also violated the duty to correct consequences of
known misconduct as set forth in Model Rule 5.1(c)(2). See supra note 86.
159 On the other hand, this factor arguably strengthens the future precedential value
of the case. Weston serves as reasonably persuasive authority for a duty to supervise, even
without the authority of any codified ethical duty (i.e., Rule 5.1).
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neys for "innocent" acts of omission." So long as Model Rule
5.1 limits supervisory responsibilities to individual partners and
individual supervisory attorneys, enforcement efforts will remain
weak. Proceeding against an individual partner or individual super-
vising attorney for failing to supervise a subordinate attorney re-
mains a theoretical possibility but not a practical one."' As the
individual supervising attorney or partner becomes more remote,
the less likely the bar is to make that individual attorney a disci-
plinary target. Because of these and other reasons,"' the bar's
task of enforcing Rule 5.1 against individual attorneys is under-
standably difficult.
Nevertheless, the bar's disciplinary efforts could improve. The
bar should, in appropriate cases,"es impose sanctions against indi-
vidual attorneys for breaching the ethical duty of reasonable super-
vision. Enforcement of Rule 5.1(a) against partners would encour-
age law firm partners and shareholders in professional corpora-
tions to undertake a careful examination of the preventive mea-
sures in effect at the firm and of their reasonableness under the
circumstances. Similarly, enforcement of Rule 5.1(b) would require
tracing the subordinate attorney's violation to a (responsible)
direct supervisory attorney, and then determining whether that
supervisory attorney provided reasonable supervision under the
circumstances. Admittedly, disciplinary investigations involving
these types of efforts might be difficult and expensive. Yet, if the
legal profession is to reap the benefits of prevention through
supervision, the disciplinary bar must better utilize its traditional
disciplinary weapons and impose the full range of sanctions
against individual attorneys in appropriate cases.' 64
160 See Schneyer, supra note 26, at 17-20.
161 See id. (discussing the difficulty in singling out any one or more culpable partners
as disciplinary targets and noting that it is unrealistic to discipline all the partners).
162 For a more complete explanation of these reasons, see infra Part V (leading to
the recommendation of addressing reasonable supervision to the firm and disciplining the
firm for inadequate supervision).
163 Technically, every case of professional discipline not involving a sole practitioner
presents an opportunity to consider the issue of supervision.
164 The bar can establish positive and negative incentives to motivate partners and
supervisory attorneys to institute preventive "Supervisory Conditions" in their firms. This
can be accomplished by rewarding or punishing their efforts through the use of aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors in adjusting sanctions. See infra notes 185-91 and accompanying
text.
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IV. INDEPENDENT RESPONSIBILITY OF SUBORDINATE ATTORNEYS
Rule 5.2 addresses the duties of an associate or subordinate
lawyer. This section explores whether Rule 5.2 can operate to
make subordinate attorneys more actively responsible for the ex-
tent of supervision they receive. One can view Rule 5.2 as serving
to encourage associates to question the ethical atmosphere in
which they practice. Furthermore, Rule 5.2 serves to motivate
subordinate attorneys to consider consciously their own indepen-
dent ethical obligations and in doing so, whether additional super-
vision and guidance is necessary to fulfill their ultimate obligation
of ethical conduct. Subordinate attorneys should not perceive their
role as passive with respect to supervision.
Since the duty of partners and supervising attorneys is to
supervise subordinates' compliance with the Rules of Professional
Conduct, the role of the subordinate within the hierarchy of the
firm is presumably to obey the supervising attorney and part-
ner.1" As Rule 5.2(b) points out, however, a subordinate
attorney's defense that he or she was merely "following orders"
allows the subordinate, only in limited circumstances, to escape
disciplinary responsibility for his or her misconduct resulting from
following the supervisor's wrongful orders. Ultimately, it operates
to "fix"16 liability, but underneath that effect lies the purpose of
encouraging subordinates to challenge questionable orders re-
ceived from superiors in an attempt to prevent misconduct which
might otherwise occur by blindly following orders.
Essentially, a subordinate's "following orders" defense depends
on the reasonableness of the order. If the order is reasonable (but
later turns out to be professional misconduct), the subordinate
may obey the reasonable order without disciplinary responsibility.
If the order is not reasonable (and later turns out to be profes-
165 See Leonard Gross, Ethical Problems of Law Firm Associates, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV.
259 (1985) (analyzing duties and obligations of subordinate attorneys to the firm in light
of ethics rules). Professor Gross' article remains one of the few that deals directly with
subordinate attorneys' dilemmas. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12, § 5.2:201, at 779. See
also Lawrence K Hellman, The Effects of Law Office Work on the Formation of Law Students'
Professional Values: Observation, Explanation, Optimization, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 537 (1991)
(discussing student interns' law office experiences as counterproductive to instilling pro-
fessional values); Mary Twitchell, The Ethical Dilemmas of Lawyers on Teams, 72 MINN. L
REV. 697 (1988) (discussing unique problems encountered in lawyer teams).
166 See Schneyer, supra note 23, at 948 (questioning, in a similar way, whether Rule




sional misconduct), the subordinate proceeds at his or her own
risk and bears disciplinary responsibility for following the
supervisor's unreasonable order. Applying this rule places final
responsibility on the subordinate to determine, prior to following
the supervisor's order, the reasonableness of the order under the
limited disciplinary immunity afforded under Rule 5.2.
Because the subordinate bears ultimate disciplinary respon-
sibility, Rule 5.2 should prompt subordinates to seek out effective
guidance and supervision from superiors or others when a ques-
tion of professional conduct is raised, whether the ethical question
is raised by an affirmative order of a superior or by the passive
neglect of supervisory attorneys. Seeking guidance within the firm
on whether a particular proposed course of conduct is ethically
proper creates an "atmosphere of attention to matters of profes-
sional ethics"167  and illustrates the importance of the
subordinate's role in fostering a firm's ethical infrastructure. Thus,
disallowing a subordinate's "following orders" defense represents
sound policy for encouraging resolution of ethical questions within
the firm.
Although Rule 5.2 is entitled "Responsibilities of a Subordi-
nate Lawyer," its first provision actually describes the responsibili-
ties of all lawyers."6 Rule 5.2(a) states that a "lawyer is bound by
the Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer
acted at the direction of another person."" All attorneys, includ-
ing subordinate attorneys, are responsible for their own miscon-
duct even if it occurred at the direction of a supervisor, and even
if the attorney acquiesced from a fear of loss of employment. 70
167 This is the language used b' Hazard & Hodes to describe the purpose of Rule
5.1. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12, § 5.1:101, at 769. The same purpose underlies
Rule 5.2.
168 In fact, the term "subordinate lawyer" is not even used in Rule 5.2(a).
169 MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Rule 5.2(a). The Rule says "another person." Com-
pare a lawyer's independent duties under Rule 5.2(a) with Rule 5A(c) which states that
"[a] lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to
render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment
in rendering such legal services." Id. Rule 5.4(c) (emphasis added). "Where someone
other than the client pays the lawyer's fee or salary, or recommends employment of the
lawyer, that arrangement does not modify the lawyer's obligation to the client." Id. Rule
5.4 cmt.
170 WOLFRAM, supra note 4, at 883 (noting that a subordinate's misconduct is not
excused even when the lawyer who orders the misconduct has "hire-or-fire or similar
organizational power over the subordinate"). Se, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Kahn, 431 A.2d 1336, 1351 (Md. 1981) (noting that the high ethical standards and pro-
fessional obligations of an attorney may never be breached even if the attorney's employ-
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er directs the action and threatens to dismiss the lawyer); In re Knight, 281 A.2d 46, 47-
48 (Vt. 1971) (holding that an inexperienced attorney, although dominated by an experi-
enced supervising attorney and afraid of losing his job, is disciplined for participating in
an entrapment scheme).
One author has suggested that, by implication, this rule requires the subordinate at-
torney to report the supervisory attorney to the bar when the supervisor issues an order
which the subordinate, under Rule 5.2, would be required to disobey. L. Harold
Levinson, Ethics Inside the Law Firm, Do It My Way or You're Fired, 36 VAND. L. REV. 847,
852 (1983) (book review).
Limited civil protection may be available to attorneys who are fired from their firms
for acting in accordance with the rules of ethics. In a recent case of first impression, the
New York Court of Appeals held that a lawyer who was discharged for insisting that his
law firm report the professional misconduct of a colleague could pursue an action for
breach of contract. Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992). Attorney Wieder had
knowledge of professional misconduct of a colleague at the firm which he was required
to report to the bar under NEw YORK CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-
103(A) (1990). Wieder informed the firm's partners so that they could report the matter
to the bar. They refused to do so and threatened Wieder that they would fire him if he
reported it. Wieder, 609 N.E.2d at 106. At Wieder's persistence, the firm finally reported
the matter to the bar. Id. Ultimately, Wieder was fired, allegedly for forcing the firm to
file the required report. Id. The court declined to create a public policy exception to
New York's strong employment-at-will doctrine regarding the tortious wrongful discharge
cause of action, but upheld his cause of action for breach of contract. Id. Thirteen legal
ethics and labor law experts and the Bar Association of the City of New York had filed
briefs of amicus curiae in support of attorney Wieder. Andrew Blum, The Dangers of Up-
holding Legal Ethics, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 2, 1992, at 8.
By providing even this limited form of civil protection from wrongful discharge, the
Wteder rule should operate to give subordinate attorneys some (en)courage(ment) to (1)
refuse improper orders generally and (2) insist that serious acts of intra-firm attorney
misconduct be reported to the bar. While the fear of being reported would presumably
inhibit wrongdoing, a more direct way to prevent misconduct is through supervision. Had
the firm properly supervised Larry Lubin, the violating lawyer who was eventually report-
ed and the direct cause of Wieder's dilemma, Lubin's misconduct may have been com-
pletely prevented or at least uncovered and corrected much earlier. Wieder's problems
with his firm may never have arisen if Larry Lubin had been properly supervised (poten-
tially preventing his misconduct).
Conversely, reporting is a response to past and completed misconduct. Moreover,
reporting is required only for serious acts of misconduct (under the Model Rules but not
so limited under the Model Code) and reporting would actually be prohibited, in most
cases absent client consent, if it involved the disclosure of confidential information. MOD-
EL RuLES, supra note 11, Rule 8.3; MODEL CODE, supra note 12, DR 1-103. See In re
Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (I1. 1988) (suspending an attorney for not reporting miscon-
duct as required by the Model Code). Attorney compliance with the reporting rule has
been and likely will remain notoriously low. For further commentary on Himmel and the
reporting rule, see Irwin D. Miller, Breaking the Written Code of Silence in Legal Malpractice
Settlements, 6 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 187 (1992) (condemning, as a form of disciplinary
blackmail, attorneys' threats to report malpracticing attorneys in the negotiation and
settlement of legal malpractice cases); Ronald Rotunda, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Another
Lawyer's Unethical Irolations in the Wake of Himmel, 1988 U. ILL L REV. 977.
Whether encouraged to report by limited civil protection (Wieder rule) or motivated
by fear of discipline for not reporting (Himmel rule), the reporting rule's premise that at-
torneys will refrain from misconduct from a fear of being reported requires closer scruti-
ny. Viewed from an intra-firm perspective, reporting colleague misconduct simply may not
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This rule unequivocally disposes of any "Nuremberg" defense in
which a subordinate attempts to deny responsibility because he or
she was merely acting in accordance with the orders of a superi-
or.171 In a larger sense, however, this rule of independent re-
sponsibility simply states an obvious and paramount duty of pro-
fessional conduct: each lawyer is ultimately responsible for his or
her own actions.
172
While Rule 5.2(a) independently binds all attorneys to the
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5.2(b) does provide subordi-
nate lawyers with a limited "following orders" defense. Rule 5.2(b)
states that a "subordinate lawyer does not violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a su-
pervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of
professional duty."' 3 Since "application of the rules [of ethics]
often involves subtle matters of judgment and discretion,"1 74 any
lawyer (subordinate or supervisor) behaving in accordance with a
reasonable interpretation of an arguable issue of professional con-
duct should not suffer disciplinary action. 75 From that practical
perspective Rule 5.2(b), like Rule 5.2(a), is sensible but provides
nothing too substantial. Providing this form of limited, disciplinary
immunity 76 does, however, help resolve a subordinate's dilemma
by explicitly permitting subordinate lawyers to defer to a superior's
reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.
The Comment to Rule 5.2 suggests that allowing the subordi-
nate to defer to the supervisor's reasonable resolution is a prac-
tical matter because, faced with alternatives in resolving a dilem-
ma, "someone has to decide upon the course of action."" On
compare favorably with supervising colleague conduct reporting indirectly inhibits miscon-
duct by operating primarily on fear and mistrust between intra-firm attorneys, whereas
supervision directly prevents misconduct through rapport and collaboration. See also Haz-
ard, supra note 80, at 15-16 (discussing pitfialls in the Weder approach and suggesting a
closer look at Rule 5.1's preventive approach).
171 HAzARD & HODES, supra note 12, § 5.2:100, at 778.
172 "Technically speaking, Rule 5.2(a) is superfluous, for in its absence subordinate
lawyers would still be bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct." Id. § 5.2:201, at 779.
173 MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Rule 5.2(b) (emphasis added).
174 HAzARD & HODES, supra note 12, § 5.2:101, at 778.
175 "[I]f the matter is indeed debatable, then even the supervisory lawyer will proba-
bly not be found to have violated the Rules of Professional Conduct by making a choice
that is later determined to have been wrong." Id. § 5.2:301, at 781. Accord MONROE H.
FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING ILANwY's ETHics B-6 (1990).
176 HAzARD & HODES, supra note 12, § 5.2:301, at 781.
177 MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Rule 5.2 cmt. "In . . . debatable cases, there must
be a mechanism for breaking the impasse when two or more lawyers working together
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the other hand, subordinates deferring too readily to a
supervisor's resolution of an ethical question means that a
subordinate's independent duty under Rule 5.2(a) can become too
easily compromised. 178 The question becomes a matter of deter-
mining how much latitude should be allowed in the subordinate's
determination of reasonableness and, therefore, how much com-
promising of the subordinate's independent ethical duty mandated
by Rule 5.2(a) should be allowed.
A subordinate's duty of independent ethical conduct under
Rule 5.2(a) takes precedence over the limited permission to defer
under Rule 5.2(b) with respect to inadequate supervision. In other
words, subordinates may not defer to a supervisor's failure to su-
pervise properly. Failing to supervise is not a reasonable resolution
of an arguable question of professional duty, and a subordinate
should not be afforded disciplinary immunity for misconduct
occuring in the unsupervised practice setting.
The subordinate's independent duty of competency can be
used as an illustration. Recall partners' and supervising attorneys'
ethical obligation to supervise under Rule 5.1. In the context of
supervision and application of Rule 5.2, the subordinate has an
independent duty to take necessary steps, including seeking super-
vision, to ensure that the subordinate is providing competent legal
services to the client.19 The subordinate's duty of competency
applies regardless of the level of supervision he or she is receiving.
Therefore, tying the subordinate's independent duty of competen-
cy to his or her evaluation of the firm's supervisory conditions is,
admittedly, difficult. Yet, the underlying purpose behind making
this connection is to elevate the subordinate's passive acceptance
cannot agree on a course of action." HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12, § 5.2:301, at 780.
178 The supervisor must be willing to explain any order so that the subordinate can
determine whether to obey under Rule 5.2. Levinson, supra note 170, at 853. The willing-
ness of the supervisor to explain the resolution to the subordinate is important because
knowledge of whether a violation will occur marks the transition from Rule 5.2(a) to
5.2(b). HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12, § 5.2:301, at 780. While Rule 5.2(b) grants the
subordinate lawyer a limited immunity when acting on the orders of a supervisory lawyer,
the element of "knowledge" is important in that grant of limited immunity.
[A] subordinate lawyer may justifiably be able to claim, in some cases, that his
violation was not "knowing" because it was urged by his or her supervisor. But
even this principle must have limits; in cases of indisputable violation, a subor-
dinate lawyer may not hide behind his superior's wrongful direction and claim
lack of knowledge.
Id. § 5.2:100, at 778.
179 MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Rule 1.1.
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of being inadequately supervised to the same level of actively fol-
lowing clearly wrongful orders. Under many circumstances, the
subordinate's action or inaction is equally blameworthy from the
perspective of the resulting harm to a client, and thus to the pro-
fession. If a subordinate understands and believes that his or her
passive deference to inadequate supervision is as potentially uneth-
ical as following clearly wrongful orders, a subordinate is much
more likely to take corrective measures.
The subordinate's independent professional duty to render
competent legal services to clients is not an arguable question
within the meaning of Rule 5.2(b). If the subordinate lacks the
time, training, resources, or expertise to represent the client com-
petently, or if the subordinate is not receiving adequate guidance
or supervision in the handling of clients' matters, the subordinate
is obligated to correct that situation to avoid potential ethical
breaches."8 To correct the deficient practice setting, the subordi-
nate may need to bring the matter to the attention of his or her
supervisor.' Rule 5.2(b) obligates the supervisor to provide a
reasonable resolution of the issue of professional' duty raised by
the subordinate. The subordinate's permission to defer to the
supervisor's resolution (within the meaning of Rule 5.2(b) disci-
plinary immunity) is dependent upon the reasonableness of the
resolution. The only reasonable resolution under these circum-
stances is for the supervisor to take positive steps to ensure that
the subordinate is properly supervised. The subordinate's obliga-
tion under Rule 5.2(b) is to determine whether the steps taken by
the supervisor are reasonable under the circumstances.
Applying this obligation would normally require that the sub-
ordinate perceive his or her own weaknesses and advise the super-
visor of the situation. Placing a burden on subordinates to confess
their limitations and request supervisory assistance is difficult,
8 2
180 See Gross, supra note 165, at 304-06.
181 Ethics opinions have suggested that subordinates should initially seek an internal
review of ethical questions. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibili-
ty, Informal Op. 1202 (1972); Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Op. 82-79
(1982).
182 The performance pressure and "practice shock" that a new lawyer feels, as well as
having a limited benchmark with which to compare his or her situation, may aggregate
to create a deferent attitude. See Gross, supra note 165, at 297-309. As Professor Wolfi-am
explains:
[A]ssociates at the beginning of their careers may have very little . . . control
over their initial assignment to partners and senior assdciates with whom they
must work. Many associates come*... unaccustomed to the ways of law
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but subordinates must take at least initial responsibility to rectify a
practice setting in which lack of supervision is contributing to
questionable representation. Placing some of the burden of ade-
quate supervision on the subordinate is sensible since the subordi-
nate is in the better position to determine his or her own limita-
tions and the supervisor may not be objective."s
If subordinates recall that the duty of basic competency under
Rule 1.1 and the independent duty of ethical conduct under Rule
5.2(a) exposes them to sanctions, subordinates should seek neces-
sary supervision and guidance. Similarly, supervisors have an incen-
tive to discover whether the subordinates within their scope of
supervisory responsibilities are receiving adequate supervision and
guidance. The supervisor's potential liability under Rule 5.1 for
failing to supervise provides an incentive to correct the situation
especially after it has been brought to his or her attention by the
subordinate. Likewise, the subordinate's hesitancy to alert the
supervisor should be reduced by the belief that his or her self-
disclosure reduces the supervisor's exposure to a Rule 5.1 viola-
tion."
These principles extend beyond issues of competency and can
be applied broadly to encompass a subordinate's independent duty
of ethical conduct generally. From the bar's view, if disallowing a
subordinate's "following orders" defense represents good disciplin-
ary policy, the converse in a passive context must also be encour-
aged. If the subordinate's misconduct occurs (or its potential ex-
ists) as a result of not following orders because the supervisor has
firms .... They are likely . . . to be awed by the professional prowess of part-
ners .... Associates very quickly develop strong loyalties to a supporting part-
ner, who may be the passkey to discretionary salary increases, favorable work
assignments, greater professional responsibility and more interesting work, and
advancement in the firm. The relationship and the work environment, in short,
leave associates with little ethical room to maneuver and readily susceptible to
direction and even to hints and more subtle directive cues from senior lawyers.
WOLFRAM, supra note 4, at 881.
183 See Gross, supra note 165, at 304-06. Professor Gross notes that lack of time and
skill fall outside the scope of those arguable questions to which an associate can defer to
the judgment of the supervisor because the supervisor is not in as good a position to
objectively judge the situation as is the associate. The associate is in a better position
than the firm to evaluate his or her knowledge of a subject and the time he or she has
to devote to it. Moreover, the supervisor may not be objective from a financial self-inter-
est perspective. Therefore, the associate should not escape liability because he or she
followed the supervisor's or partner's instructions. Id. at 306.
184 The supervisor may simply not know or fully appreciate the subordinate's situa-
[Vol. 70:2
ATrORNEYS' SUPERVISORY DUTIES
not provided a reasonable degree of supervision (in violation of
5.1), the subordinate must bear responsibility for allowing the
misconduct (or potential misconduct) to occur as a result of not
being properly supervised. If the subordinate received inadequate
supervision and guidance which contributed to the subordinate's
misconduct, then disallowing the subordinate's (proposed) defense
of being unguided and unsupervised applies as strongly as disal-
lowing a "following wrongful orders" defense.
If the level of supervision provided is inadequate, Rule 5.2(b)
does not permit the associate to accede to the supervisor's failure
to provide reasonable supervision. The supervisor's failure to pro-
vide adequate supervision is not a reasonable resolution of an
arguable question of professional duty within the meaning of Rule
5.2(b), especially after the subordinate has raised the concerns.
Not only is the supervising attorney breaching the affirmative du-
ties of Rule 5.1, but the subordinate who continues to practice
under these conditions does so at his or her own risk and should
not be immune from disciplinary responsibility under Rule 5.2(b).
Since "following wrongful orders" in an active context is a
meritless defense, then "following no orders" in a passive context
should similarly fail.
Translating this policy of "subordinate responsibility to be
supervised" into disciplinary policy is problematic. Disciplinary
authorities faced with imposing sanctions for professional miscon-
duct committed by unsupervised subordinates have difficult choices
to make. On one hand, disciplinary officials could be harsh and
decline to consider any extenuating circumstances and hold subor-
dinates strictly accountable for their misconduct." In fact, this
disciplinary approach probably best serves a policy of encouraging
subordinates to seek supervision by inducing the fear of full disci-
plinary exposure. Yet, depending on the circumstances surround-
ing the misconduct, an attorney's inexperience and status as a
subordinate within the hierarchy of the firm intuitively warrants
some compassion. Further, these situations raise the question
185 Indeed, subordinate attorneys should recall that the disciplinary opinions that
have considered a subordinate's wrongdoing in the context of lack of supervision general-
ly have been unsympathetic to the subordinate's plight. See, e.g., Yacavino, 494 A.2d at
803 (cautioning supervisory attorneys to provide adequate supervision but imposing pro-
fessional discipline on subordinate attorney regardless of lack of supervision, stating
"[w]ithout mitigating respondent's fault"); Bany, 447 A.2d at 925 ("Respondent does not
seek to place on his employers the blame for his quandary, nor would this record satisfy
us that it should be laid there."). See also supra Part III.D.
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whether the misconduct could have been prevented under a more
closely supervised setting, a responsibility belonging primarily, and
at least initially, to direct supervisors and partners under Rule 5.1.
Holding the subordinate fully responsible for misconduct that may
have been preventable by adequate supervision is unbalanced
because responsibility should be shared with the neglectful supervi-
sor. Yet, disciplinary policy must also encourage subordinates to be
responsible for the level of supervision within which they practice,
especially in light of a subordinate's deferent inclinations.
Reducing a subordinate's natural reluctance and allocating
responsibility more fairly can be accomplished by adjusting sanc-
tions through the use of mitigating and aggravating factors. The
ABA has promulgated standards incorporating mitigating and ag-
gravating factors for consideration in determining an appropriate
sanction.8 ' Mitigating factors include any circumstances sur-
rounding the misconduct that might justify a reduction in the
sanction that would otherwise be imposed.'87 Conversely, aggra-
vating factors include circumstances that justify increasing the
degree of discipline.ss The ABA's list of mitigating and aggra-
vating circumstances does not specifically include consideration of
the organizational status of the disciplined attorney as either that
of a subordinate or supervising attorney.1 89 The hierarchical sta-
tus of the violating attorney, standing alone, should generally nei-
ther mitigate nor aggravate a sanction for professional misconduct.
On the other hand, the ABA standards should explicitly rec-
ognize "Supervisory Conditions" operating within the firm as either
mitigating or aggravating an otherwise appropriate sanction. Legiti-
mizing such factors would enable a disciplinary court to examine
the supervisory circumstances and fashion policy accordingly. "Su-
pervisory Conditions" or circumstances, which indicate the
186 "In imposing a sanction after a finding of lawyer misconduct, a court should
consider the following factors: (a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state; and
(c) the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (d) the exis-
tence of aggravating or mitigating factors." MODEL SANCrIONS, supra note 3, Standard 3.0.
187 MODEL SANcTIONS, supra note 3, Standard 9.3 (describing in Standard 9.32 a list
of some thirteen possible mitigating factors).
188 MODEL SANCTIONS, supra note 3, Standard 9.2 (describing in Standard 9.22 a list
of eleven factors which may be considered in aggravation).
189 The Model Sanctions loosely allude to the status of the violating attorney by in-
cluding inexperience in the practice of law as a mitigating factor. MODEL SANCnONS,
supra note 3, Standard 9.32(f) (citing In re Price, 429 N.E.2d 961 (Ind. 1982)). Addition-
ally, the Model Sanctions recommend that the violating attorney's substantial experience
in the practice of law can be an aggravating factor. Id. Standard 9.22(i) (citing John F.
Buckley, 2 Mass. Att'y Dis. Rep. 24 (1980)).
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subordinate's good faith efforts to prevent the misconduct by
seeking supervision, should be affirmatively encouraged by explicit-
ly recognizing such actions as mitigating. Conversely, "Supervisory
Conditions" or circumstances that suggest a subordinate's lack of
attention to his or her obligation to seek supervision when neces-
sary, should be discouraged by considering such inaction or con-
scious disregard to be an aggravating factor.
Similarly, these proposed "Supervisory Conditions" could also
operate to adjust sanctions that might otherwise be imposed on
partners and supervisory attorneys. Indeed, supervisory attorneys
should be rewarded for implementing positive "Supervisory Condi-
tions" (by recognizing positive conditions as a mitigating factor)
and punished for their lack of supervision (by recognizing nega-
tive supervisory conditions as an aggravating factor). By providing
incentive and, motivation in the form of disciplinary rewards and
punishments through mitigating and aggravating factors, the bar
can encourage both supervisory and subordinate attorneys to con-
sciously consider "Supervisory Conditions" as an important pre-
ventive component of their law practice settings.
Some disciplinary opinions have considered similar types of
circumstances as bases for determining an appropriate sanction,
but haphazardly and without a clearly expressed policy goal in
mind."9 Prevention is the policy goal. Specific recognition of
190 See, e.g., Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525, 546 (4th Cir.
1990) (imposing Rule 11 sanctions on the senior trial attorney, but not on the inexperi-
enced junior attorney to whom the senior attorney had delegated a complex case, imme-
diately prior to trial); In re Petty, 627 P.2d 191 (Cal. 1981) (defrauding insurance compa-
nies, clearly wrongful conduct, not excused by youth or inexperience); In re Callahan,
442 N.W.2d 1092, 1095 (Ind. 1982) (noting that age and inexperience are not mitigating
factors where subordinate participated and profited in extortion scheme); Attorney Griev-
ance Comm'n v. Boehm, 446 A.2d 52 (Md. 1982) (holding that misappropriation is not
excused by inexperience); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kahn, 431 A.2d 1336, 1351
(Md. 1981) (not mitigating sanction even when subordinate attorney is threatened with
being fired for not following unethical order); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. O'Neill,
400 A.2d 415, 447 (Md. 1979) (mitigating the sanction bised on attorney's youth and
inexperience); In re Mogel, 238 N.Y.S.2d 683, 685 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963) (mitigating sanc-
tion because attorney did not initiate nor actively continue the misconduct); In re Moore,
312 S.E.2d 1, 3 (S.C. 1984) (mitigating sanction of subordinate attorney, based on inex-
perience, for following orders of supervising attorney- not mitigating sanction of super-
vising attorney who had been in practice more than twenty years); In re Knight, 281 A.2d
46, 48 (Vt. 1971) (not mitigating sanction because subordinate attorney did not withdraw
when the opportunity arose); see also Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA), at
101:3203 ((citing McMorris v. State Bar, 623 P.2d 781 (Cal. 1981); Disciplinary Board v.
Amundson, 297 N.W.2d 433 (N.D. 1980); In re Kennedy, 649 P.2d 110 (Wash. 1982))
noting that a lawyer's excuse that he or she had taken on too much work will generally
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"Supervisory Conditions" as a legitimate mitigating and aggravating
factor provides disciplinary agencies with a flexible formula to
promote that policy goal more coherently. By explicitly including
"Supervisory Conditions" as a mitigating and aggravating consider-
ation for disciplinary agencies to use for and against both subordi-
nate and supervising attorneys, the level of supervision within a
firm becomes a legitimate and concrete consideration. Finally, the
increased exposure is invaluable. Each disciplinary opinion that
applies "Supervisory Conditions" as mitigating or aggravating, re-
minds subordinates and supervisors alike of their respective roles
in preventing misconduct.91
V. ENFORCEMENT OF SUPERVISORY DUTIES AGAINST LAW FIRMS
In conjunction with strengthening enforcement efforts against
individual supervisory attorneys192 and encouraging subordinate
attorneys to share supervisory responsibility,"3 disciplinary en-
forcement of supervision can be accomplished by another means.
Since supervisory duties involve both the efforts of individual su-
pervising attorneys as well as the efforts of law firm management
to create supervisory policy, the law firm as an entity should also
be accountable for disciplinary purposes. Therefore, this section of
the article advocates that supervisory duties currently addressed to
only individual attorneys, also be directed to the law firm as a
whole. Violating a firm-directed ethical duty of reasonable supervi-
sion would subject the firm to appropriate professional discipline.
Regulation of the bar has never included the imposition of
professional discipline on law firms, but recent developments sug-
gest such expansion may be forthcoming. In a recent, important
law review article, Professor Ted Schneyer pointed to one signif-
icant shortcoming of the current attorney disciplinary system: its
single focus on individual attorneys.'94 He noted that existing dis-
ciplinary rules predominately regulate only individual attorney be-
havior. Therefore, disciplinary agencies target only individual attor-
not be considered in mitigation because the overworked condition is within the lawyer's
control).
191 The flexibility of adjusting sanctions upward and downward, which create positive
and negative compliance incentives, can also be used in sanctioning the law firm as a
whole for violations of a firm-directed reasonable supervision rule. See infra Part V; see
also supra note 164.
192 See supra Part III.D.
193 See supra Part IV.
194 Schneyer, supra note 26, at 4.
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neys in imposing sanctions for ethical breaches."'- He argues that
such a limited disciplinary regime is no longer sufficient in an era
of law firms and simply does not comport with the reality of mod-
em law practice. 9  To overcome this gap in attorney regulation,
Professor Schneyer proposes an expanded disciplinary system
which allows for the imposition of appropriate disciplinary sanc-
tions on law firms." While Professor Schneyer advocates general-
ly a form of vicarious disciplinary responsibility of the law firm,
this article is limited to arguing for expanding the ethical duty of
reasonable supervision to the firm, the breach of which constitutes
the firm's independent violation justifying discipline. Since supervi-
sion of subordinate attorneys concerns both law firm policy and
individual attorneys' efforts, the option to enforce supervisory re-
sponsibilities against the firm is particularly suitable for this pro-
phylactic rule.198
With respect to enforcement of supervisory duties against
individual attorneys, Professor Schneyer explains that the prospects
of using Model Rule 5.1 as a disciplinary response vary inversely
with firm size."' The larger the organization, the worse the pros-
pects, since enforcement against individuals is difficult because the
individual attorneys are effectively insulated by the size and bu-
reaucracy of the firm.2" Conversely, the smaller the organization,
the better the prospects of enforcing Rule 5.1 since the individual
attorney purportedly "responsible" for supervising can be identified
more easily in a smaller, less complex organization of lawyers.20'
Yet even in smaller firms, Professor Schneyer speculates that the
bar might be reluctant to impose the stigma of professional disci-
195 Id.
196 See id. at 4-8 (noting that the nature of group practice creates a kind of informal
immunity from discipline, and as a result, lawyers in firms are rarely disciplined, partly
because of evidentiary problems in assigning blame to particular attorneys).
197 Id. at 11.
198 Rule 5.1 addresses the supervisory responsibilities of "a partner" (Rule 5.1(a)) and
a "lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer" (Rule 5.1(b)). MODEL
RULES, supra note 11, Rule 5.1. Therefore, current enforcement efforts could only target
individual partners and individual supervisory lawyers. See also Deborah L. Rhode, Insti-
tutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L REV. 665, 700-02 (1994) (discussing the value of
systems for internal oversight in legal organizations: "Where rule violations involve organi-
zational failures, such as inadequate supervision ... the organization should be ac-
countable.")..
199 Schneyer, supra note 26, at 18.
200 Id. at 4-6.
201 Id. at 18.
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pline on "innocent" lawyers for "merely negligent omissions. "102
Moreover, in medium and large size firms, the reluctance to disci-
pline for Rule 5.1 violations is even greater. In a larger setting,
the attorneys who "did nothing" are even more remote and iso-
lated from the misbehaving attorney than in a smaller setting.
Worse yet, in cases where the firm completely lacks supervisory
measures,"3 the difficulties in singling out any particular partner
or supervising attorney as an appropriate disciplinary target means
the bar does nothing and Rule 5.1 remains largely unenforced."'
Professor Schneyer's speculation regarding the difficulties of en-
forcing Rule 5.1 against individual attorneys or partners is evi-
denced by the scarcity of case law on point.
Professor Schneyer's persuasive arguments for expanding the
bar's disciplinary horizons to the law firm as an entity were recent-
ly recognized and, if acted upon, will make New York the first
state to allow for the professional discipline of the law firm as a
whole. In a twenty-page report, the Committee on Professional
Responsibility of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York (the "New York Report") cited with approval the regulatory
deficiencies noted in Professor Schneyer's article. As a result, the
New York Report recommends three provisions of the state's ethics
code be directed to the law firm as a whole."5 The report fur-
ther recommends appropriate sanctions for enforcement purposes.
Acceptance in New York strongly portends widespread discussion
regarding the merits of the proposal.
While New York's appellate divisions, responsible for making
any such changes, are studying the proposals, the New York
Report's recommendations are receiving national exposure. For
example, a recent ABA Journal article (partially entitled "Promot-
ing Better Supervision") characterized the proposed changes in
New York's disciplinary rules as "sweeping."206 Noted ethics ex-
202 Id.
203 See id. at 18-19 (describing In re Yacavino, 494 A.2d 801 (N.J. 1985) as a case
illustrating the problem of a firm having no monitoring procedures at all, rather than
the problem of a supervisory lawyer following firm procedures poorly); see also supra Part
III.D.
204 "With . . . larger firms, [Model Rule] 5.1(a) has so far been a disciplinary dead
letter." Schneyer, supra note 26, at 19.
205 See infra notes 220-24 and accompanying text.
206 Henry J. Reske, Promoting Better Supevision, N.Y. Bar Committee Recommends Ethics
Rule Changes to Permit Law-Firm Sanctions, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 32. See also Edward A.
Adams, Bar:. Discipline Rules Should Cover Firms, NAT'L LJ., July 5, 1993, at 10; Edward A.
Adams, Bar Report Urges Courts Apply Disciplinary Rules to Law Firms, N.Y. LJ., June 25,
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pert, Professor Stephen Gillers, expressed his belief that "[t]he
new rules would be a means of catching up with reality... "207
and that the proposal "takes several giant steps in expanding [vi-
carious disciplinary responsibility] concepts and applying them to
the whole entity, not just the individual."2"8 These recent devel-
opments show promise in creating a new disciplinary weapon for
enforcing Model Rule 5.1's supervisory duties.
Using the reasoning in Professor Schneyer's article, the New
York Report initially explains why it is appropriate to aim some
disciplinary rules at law firms' conduct rather than solely at indi-
vidual attorneys' conduct. Professor Schneyer's article recognizes
three reasons for the practical difficulties in enforcing certain
rules against individual attorneys. These practical problems make
the enforcement of supervisory duties particularly difficult. First, it
is often difficult to determine which particular attorney is at fault.
For example, in a large firm setting where legal tasks are often
accomplished in teams, tracing blame to an individual attorney is
particularly difficult.21 Identifying the responsible supervisory at-
torney(s) is problematic. Second, assuming that the difficulties of
assigning blame could be solved through tracing efforts by the
bar, there might still be reluctance to sanction a particular attor-
ney for ethical transgressions that others might also commit while
carrying out the firm's business.210 As a result, no attorneys are
disciplined.21 1 Third, no single lawyer may, in a disciplinary
sense, have responsibility for ethical transgressions. Rather, the law
firm's organizational and operating procedures, or lack thereof,
may be the culprit. When the firm's "ethical infrastructure"
212
may be more to blame than individual lawyers' lack of "ethical
1993, at 1 (noting that although the New York Report had not yet been widely circulat-
ed, "ethics experts gave its groundbreaking approach guarded endorsements"); Julie
Gannon Shoop, New York Considers Law Firm Liability for Ethics Violations, TRIAL, Dec. 1993,
at 14.
207 Reske, supra note 206, at 32.
208 Id.
209 Schneyer, supra note 26, at 8-9; NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 27, at 631.
210 Professor Schneyer explains that the bar's reluctance to sanction these lawyers
stems from a "fear of making them scapegoats for others in the firm." Schneyer, supra
note 26, at 10.
211 Id.; NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 27, at 631-32.
212 Schneyer, supra note 26, at 10 (referring to a firm's policies and operating proce-
dures).
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sensibilities,""- disciplinary responsibility is properly directed to-
ward the firm rather than individuals.1 4
Beyond the practical difficulties in enforcing disciplinary rules
against only individual attorneys, fundamental policy reasons sup-
port a more comprehensive system of attorney regulation. Rather
than simply expanding disciplinary targets to include law firms, the
New York Report recognizes that collective responsibility promotes
the important policy goal of prevention and states:
This Committee believes that the Disciplinary Rules should set
forth and enforce standards for law firm conduct which will
minimize the chances that lawyers practicing in firms will vio-
late the Disciplinary Rules. More emphasis on law firm (as dis-
tinct from individual lawyer) responsibility in the Disciplinary
Rules should also help firms avoid exposure to legal liability for
conduct which could have been avoided." 5
Further amplifying the fundamental goal of prevention, two no-
tions at the heart of attorney regulation should be noted. (1)
Improving the Practice Environment-The possibility of a disciplinary
sanction against the firm should discourage ethical violations by
creating a more ethical atmosphere.1 6 The mere threat of direct
discipline against the firm creates a meaningful incentive for the
principals of the firm to improve firm-wide compliance with eth-
ical rules directed at the firm, as well as those directed at individu-
al attorney conduct. 7 (2) Self-policing--The possibility of law firm
discipline makes compliance with disciplinary rules a collective
effort within the firm. Making ethics a collective effort "further[s]
the model of self-governance which is a cornerstone of the legal
profession,""8 and creates "an incentive to be attendant to ethi-
cal lapses by attorneys within the firm, as well as to firm-wide prac-
213 Id.
214 Id. at 10-11; NEw YORK REPORT, supra note 27, at 632.
215 NEw YORK REPORT, supra note 27, at 628-29.
216 Id. at 629. See also Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L REv. 659, 743-
44 (1990) (discussing interviews with lawyers who suggested that it was partly their firms'
structure and atmosphere that fostered deception to clients).
217 In 'its discussion of the effect of improving the practice environment, the New
York Report quotes from the official comment to Model Rule 5.1: "The ethical atmo-
sphere of a firm can influence the conduct of its members." NEw YORK REPORT, supra
note 27, at 629 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1 cmt.
(1993)).
218 NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 27, at 629.
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tices which may encourage, or insufficiently regulate, the possibility
of individual ethical violations."219
Proper supervision is a key ingredient in enhancing ethical
law firm conduct. New York's current partial adoption of its Rule
5.1 counterpart20 does not expressly mandate an affirmative and
independent supervisory duty on partners and direct supervisory
lawyers as does Rule 5.1. New York's version makes a lawyer
disciplinarily responsible for another lawyer's ethical violation only
if the lawyer has supervisory authority over the violating lawyer,
knew or should have known of the conduct at a time when its
consequences could be avoided, and fails to take corrective ac-
tion. 1 This limited form of responsibility is insufficient. It essen-
tially creates only a duty to correct misconduct which has already
occurred; it not only fails to cover cases where no supervisory
authority exists," but also ignores areas of law practice which
are the responsibility of the entire firm rather than an individual
supervising attorney. In such cases, supervision is a matter of "col-
lective effort and should be reinforced by collective
responsibility."'
For example, supervision of attorney work product requires
sound firm-wide policies and the extent of supervision of subor-
dinate lawyers is essentially a firm-wide decision. Therefore, the
law firm as a whole should be accountable for adequate supervi-
sion. Stressing that the purpose of supervision is to foster preven-
tion, the New York Report recommends that an entire new section
to the state's current version of its counterpart to Model Rule 5.1
be added:
219 Id. at 630.
220 New York never adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct but instead re-
tained a version of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. GILLERS & SIMON,
supra note 22, at 731.
221 NEW YORK CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-104 (1990). New York's
limited version essentially adopts only the remedial function (the duty to correct) found
in Model Rule 5.1(c)(2). See supra notes 79, 86. New York's version explicitly states that
the corrective duty arises when the lawyer not only knows but "should have known" of
the misconduct, whereas Model Rule 5.1(c) (2) only provides for the duty to correct when
the lawyer "knows" of misconduct. Arguably, the "should have known" language in New
York's version creates a higher standard and encompasses a "duty to know," and there-
fore a general duty to supervise (as a way of fulfilling the "duty to know") would be im-
plied. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12, §§ 400-04, at lxxiv-Lxxx (discussing "knowl-
edge" requirement in ethics rules).
222 NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 27, at 630.
223 Id. at 631.
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A law firm shall adequately supervise the work of all partners,
[and] associates . .. who work at the firm. The degree of su-
pervision required is that which is reasonable under the circum-
stances, taking into account factors such as the experience of
the person whose work is being supervised, the amount of work
involved in a particular matter, and the likelihood that ethical
problems might arise in the course of working on the matter.
Partners are responsible for supervision of each other's work as
well as the work of associates, and every lawyer's ... work
should be supervised to some degree. Depending upon the
circumstances, adequate supervision may include steps such as
review of work product, discussion of disclosure issues and
other client problems, review of billing practices, periodic per-
formance reviews, and informal or formal auditing of records
concerning disposition of client funds and expense reimburse-
ments. 4
A disciplinary rule, affirmative and independent, mandating a
"reasonable" or "adequate" degree of supervision would be most
effective and enforceable when directed to the law firm as a
whole. A "reasonable" supervision standard, while perhaps creating
some interpretive challenges for disciplinary agencies, best serves
the overall goal of encouraging compliance without establishing an
unfair and unrealistic standard of vicarious disciplinary liability for
others' professional misconduct.
A reasonable supervision rule directed to the firm differs (at
least conceptually) from pure vicarious disciplinary liability. Disci-
plinary enforcement imposed against the firm results from the
firm's independent violation of its affirmative duty to provide a
reasonable degree of supervision. In this way, the existing and
accepted concept of supervisory responsibility, without vicarious lia-
bility, is fortified and made enforceable by its extension to the
firm in recognition of the collective nature of the duty. At the
224 Id. at 638 (emphasis added) (proposing a new paragraph B as an addition to
NEW YORK CODE OF PROFEssIONAL RESPONSIBILrIy DR 1-104 (1990)). The proposed rule
requires "adequate" supervision (or "reasonable under the circumstances") as a standard
for purposes of discipline; the rest of the rule provides instructive guidance as to what
reasonable supervision might entail. See infra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
I In addition to the specific recommendation to expand DR 1-104 to firms, the New
York Report recommends firms be included in two other specific code provisions: (1) DR
5-105(E) (proposed section requiring that law firms keep accurate records of clients and
a system for checking those records to ensure avoidance of conflicting representations);
and (2) DR 9-102(I) (proposed section requiring that law firms implement procedures




same time, pure vicarious disciplinary responsibility for others' pro-
fessional misconduct, firmly rejected in the original formulation of
Model Rule 5.1, remains rejected. Limiting the scope of a firm's
disciplinary exposure to breaching a firm-directed reasonable su-
pervision rule falls somewhat short of Professor Schneyer's more
expansive proposal of vicarious law firm discipline. Nevertheless, a
firm-directed reasonable supervision rule conceptually similar to
the one proposed in the New York Report substantially accom-
plishes the goal of preventing misconduct through reasonable
supervision. Going beyond a well-enforced, firm-directed reason-
able supervision rule to a system of vicarious disciplinary liability
may be unrealistic as well as unnecessary to accomplish a signifi-
cant prevention policy.'
225 The New York Report, however, seems to tread somewhat cautiously beyond its
proposed rule requiring reasonable supervision by law firms for work-related activities. It
also recommends a catch-all disciplinary rule for law firms:
[Ain additional Disciplinary Rule should be enacted stating that, under appropriate
circumstances, a law firm . . . may be disciplined for a violation by one of its
lawyers of any of the Disciplinary Rules.
NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 27, at 642 (emphasis added) (explaining that such a rule
is necessary to encourage more aggressive, firm-wide compliance with all of the rules).
The New York Report does not explain what circumstances would warrant disciplining the
firm as a whole, but a broad interpretation intimates a system of true vicarious law firm
discipline as advocated by Professor Schneyer.
Professor Schneyer explains that a system of vicarious law firm discipline would
need to resolve whether a due diligence defense would be allowed. A due diligence affir-
mative defense would essentially operate to allow the firm to exonerate itself by showing
it had implemented reasonable safeguards to prevent the misconduct. Professor Schneyer
offers two possibilities: (1) disallowing a due diligence defense and seeking only modest
law firm sanctions in many cases; or (2) allowing a due diligence defense, not for exon-
eration, but only for purposes of determining an appropriate sanction. Schneyer, supra
note 26, at 29-31.
Professor Schneyer seems to express a slight preference for not allowing a due dili-
gence defense (and imposing only modest sanctions) because of the difficulties disciplin-
ary agencies would have in determining if the law firm acted diligently to prevent the
misconduct. Id. at 30. He cautions that due diligence determinations would be costly and
unreliable and law firms do not yet have standardized monitoring techniques. Id. Adding
to the difficulties of determining whether a law firm acted reasonably to prevent the mis-
conduct is the reaction of the law firm to the disciplinary process. If a system of disci-
plining law firms is devised, Professor Hazard believes 'that law firms will aggressively de-
fend against disciplinary charges. Schneyer, supra note 26, at 29 n.168 (citing letter from
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. to Ted Schneyer (Feb. 12, 1991) (on file with the CORNELL LAW
REVIEW)).
Notwithstanding these difficulties, enforcing a firm-directed rule of reasonable super-
vision requires, by definition, that determinations of "reasonableness" be made. A rule of
"strict disciplinary liability" for supervision of work-related activities (i.e., no due diligence
or "reasonableness" defense but only mild sanctions for violations) might insufficiently
motivate firms to implement supervisory policy when they know that, despite all reason-
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While reasonableness embraces a proper standard against
which a law firm's supervisory efforts should be evaluated for disci-
plinary purposes, the scope of lawyers' activities to which those
supervisory efforts are directed must be sufficiently broad. The
New York Report's proposed rule of reasonable supervision re-
quires the firm to "adequately supervise the work of all partners,
[and] associates who work at the firm."2 6 Admittedly, requiring
the firm to provide a reasonable degree of supervision for all
work-related activities encompasses a great deal. Violations of any
work-related disciplinary rule would, by extension, always implicate
the supervision rule by raising the question of whether the firm
reasonably supervised in an effort to prevent that work-related
violation. Viewed in this way, the New York Report's proposed
supervision rule operates as a partial "integrating 'master
rule;'" 227 partial because it integrates only those ethics rules relat-
able efforts, a sanction is forthcoming if an attorney commits a work-related ethical in-
fraction. Moreover, a firm might be insufficiently deterred from avoiding a mere mild
sanction, such as a private reprimand. "Current strategies of low visibility reprimands for
most disciplinary violations ... do not impose the reputational costs or convey the last-
ing message that more innovative sanctions might provide." Rhode, supra note 198, at
702. See infra notes 239-41 (discussing reputational costs of adverse publicity).
Vicarious disciplinary liability without a due diligence defense would effectively elimi-
nate determinations of reasonableness for purposes of enforcing a firm-directed superviso-
ry rule and thereby essentially relegate a reasonable supervision rule to enforcement
solely by proactive means. See Schneyer, supra note 26, at 30-31. While proactive enforce-
ment is desirable and is advocated in Part VI infra, disciplinary enforcement of violations
of reasonable supervision produces valuable benefits.
Most importantly, each (difficult) determination of reasonable supervision made and
published by disciplinary officials educates and reminds law firms of their supervisory
duties. True vicarious disciplinary responsibility may be appropriate for some rules but
not one that requires firm-directed reasonable supervision. Requiring firms to make rea-
sonable efforts to supervise, under the threat of a more meaningful sanction, would pre-
sumably motivate firms to comply. Eliminating the due diligence defense eliminates a
positive incentive to comply, and under the threat of only a mild sanction, firms might
be insufficiently motivated to institute prevention programs.
Sanctions could be adjusted through the use of mitigating and aggravating factors,
similar to the way individual supervising attorneys and subordinate attorneys might be
motivated. The existence of positive "Supervisory Conditions" mitigates while negative
"Supervisory Conditions" aggravate the sanction. Holding out positive and negative incen-
tives to the law firm in this way would presumably encourage compliance with a firm-
directed reasonable supervision rule. See supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text; supra
note 164.
226 NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 27, at 638 (emphasis added).
227 This is the way Professors Hazard and Hodes explain how Model Rule 8.4 inte-
grates all the rules. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12, § 8.4:101, at 951 (Supp. 1992).
Rule 8.4(a) states that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "violate ...the Rules
of Professional Conduct . . . ." MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Rule 8.4(a). Thus, violation
of any rule of professional conduct automatically becomes professional misconduct within
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ing to "work" into the "master rule" of supervision. Rules not
relating to "work" presumably would not be subject to any supervi-
sion requirement. In this sense, the firm has no overall supervisory
duty for ethics rules falling outside the parameters of "work"-re-
lated activities. Depending upon how a disciplinary agency might
interpret ethics code sections for purposes of supervision (work-
related or not), some rules would be subject to a law firm supervi-
sion requirement whereas some rules might be excluded from
firm-wide supervisory responsibility.
This approach creates uncertainty for both firms and for the
bar. Additionally, excluding some rules as not work-related and
therefore not subject to law firm supervision is inconsistent with
promoting a policy of collective responsibility for ethical conduct.
Indeed, even Model Rule 5.1 states a supervisory responsibility for
all the Rules of Professional Conduct. Requiring supervision for all
work-related activities does clarify that important and broad area
of ethical conduct and therefore should explicitly be included in a
firm-directed reasonable supervision rule. On the other hand, to
avoid uncertainty as to which ethics rules require supervision and
to promote a fuller prevention policy, a reasonable supervision
requirement should cover all the rules of professional conduct.
A disciplinary rule requiring that firms provide reasonable
supervision necessitates bar enforcement power over law firms. No
enforcement mechanism to sanction firms currently exists"8 and
without effective enforcement procedures, disciplinary rules direct-
ed at firms would remain aspirational. The harsh sanctions of
disbarment and suspension would not be realistically appropriate
for use against a firm;' on the other hand, the traditional sanc-
tions of private reprimand and public censure are suitable, and
would be effective sanctions for enforcement of firm-directed
rules.
Ideally, the bar's enforcement capabilities would also be en-
hanced with the power to impose monetary fines in appropriate
cases. Recognizing, however, that the bar's extension of disciplin-
ary jurisdiction over law firms is relatively groundbreaking, the
power to impose monetary fines on law firms would constitute a
the meaning of 8.4(a).
228 NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 27, at 634.
229 Id. at 635.
230 Cf. Schneyer, supra note 26, at 36-37 (suggesting conditional probation for firms
could be a proper sanction under certain conditions).
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further departure from traditional disciplinary philosophy. Indeed,
though the culpability of a single attorney arguably can be more
accurately and more directly assessed than that of a firm, the ABA
has historically rejected monetary fines against individual attorneys.
"Fines are not an appropriate sanction,"23' primarily because the
imposition of monetary fines may imply the proceedings are crimi-
nal. In advocating law firm fines, Professor Schneyer evaluated the
bar's traditional opposition and argued that such objections are
"flimsy"2 2 and a "makeweight."2"3  Regardless of the suitability of
fines against individual attorneys, they are a particularly appropri-
ate sanction against the law firm as a whole. "Fines 'speak' a
corporation's language.
The New York Report acknowledged that disbarment and
suspension are not suitable sanctions against an entire firm, 5
but did recommend, with little discussion,3 6 that a disciplinary
231 MODEL SANCTIONS, supra note 3, Standard 2.8 cmt. In explaining why monetary
fines are not suitable sanctions against individual attorneys, the ABA has stated:
Fines are punitive and criminal in nature and should be avoided. The use of
fines in discipline . . .matters might be deemed to imply that the proceedings
are criminal in nature and require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, trial by ju-
ry, and other standards of criminal due process.
STANDARDS FOR LAW'ER DISCIPLINARY AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS Standard 6.14 & cmt.
(A.B.A. 1979), replaced by MODEL RULES FOR DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (A.BA 1989).
232 Schneyer, supra note 26, at 32.
233 Id. at 33. Another commentator has made a persuasive economic argument that
fines imposed against individual attorneys would effectively accomplish the deterrence goal
of attorney discipline. See Stephen G. Ben6, Note, Why Not Fine Attorneys?: An Economic
Approach to Lauyer Disciplinary Sanctions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 907 (1991).
234 Schneyer, supra note 26, at 32. See also Paul E. Fiorelli, Fine Reductions Through
Effective Ethics Programs, 56 ALB. L. REV. 403 (1992) (discussing potential reduction of
criminal penalties, available under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, to organizations
that implement effective compliance/prevention programs, to encourage companies to
exercise due diligence in developing programs designed to prevent organizational criminal
violations).
235 NEw YORK REPORT, supra note 27, at 636.
236 The New York Report noted the recent amendments to Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure which now allow for a monetary sanction against the law firm as
a whole. The amendment abolished the old rule established by Pavelic & LeFlore v.
Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989), in which old Rule 11 was construed
literally holding that the plain language of Rule 11 allowed for the imposition of sanc-
tions against only the attorneys signing the frivolous papers and not the law firm as a
whole. The public policy argument that lost in Pavelic & Leflore was that the threat of
law firm exposure to sanctions would create a greater incentive for the firm to establish
internal monitoring procedures designed to prevent Rule 11 violations. The Pavelic &
Lef.lore Court did not reject the merits of the policy argument but felt constrained by the
plain language of Rule 11. The Rule 11 amendments show that the policy goal of creat-
ing law firm incentives to prevent violations ultimately prevailed.
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agency be authorized to "censure, or, in the appropriate circum-
stances, fine any law firm... when the law firm as a whole is
guilty of professional misconduct, malpractice, fraud, deceit, crime
or misdemeanor or any conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice. "23
7
The power to impose monetary fines on law firms would sup-
ply substantial enforcement power to disciplinary agencies. Mone-
tary fines can be adjusted upward or downward on a case by case
basis allowing disciplinary agencies the flexibility to apply various
mitigating and aggravating circumstances on an individual basis.
Since law firm supervisory failings would range from mild to se-
vere, monetary fines could be scaled accordingly, thereby enabling
disciplinary agencies to promote more accurately supervisory policy
at the disciplinary level.
Nevertheless, deeply-rooted historical bias against monetary
fines should not curtail a conceptual debate on the overall merits
of law firm discipline. It would be extremely unfortunate for a
system of law firm discipline to, be rejected because of substantial
opposition against monetary fines, especially considering the fact
that fines might be unnecessary to enforce firm-directed super-
visory duties in particular. Controversy over an enforcement tool
which may not be widely used or even necessary to achieve the
underlying goals should not stall or defeat the concept of law firm
discipline.' The sanctions of private reprimand and public cen-
sure, traditional enforcement methods which would presumably
create less controversy or oppositi6n, are also available. 9
Public censure alone might be an effective sanction, at least
with respect to some segments of the market.2 ° A public censure
237 NEw YORK REPORT, supra note 27, at 637 (recommending amendment to Judiciary
Law Section 90(2)). The New York Report did not recommend the power to impose
fines on individual attorneys.
238 The same can be said with respect to fine-tuning other aspects of disciplining
firms, such as allowing a due diligence defense or not. See supra note 225.
239 A private reprimand rather than a public censure might be appropriate under cir-
cumstances showing a breach of supervisory duties with mitigating circumstances. The
firm would then be on a form of notice to correct its supervisory deficiencies or risk a
public censure.
240 See Schneyer, supra note 26, at 33-36 (discussing adverse publicity as an en-
forcement tool against law firms); see also Rhode, supra note 198, at 701-02 (noting that
research on white-collar crime suggests that publicity of organizational sanctions has de-
terrent value).
California law firms may "someday" suffer the negative publicity of having their
firms' name publicized along with the sanctioned attorney. A specially-appointed commit-
tee studied the California bar's disciplinary system and recently recommended "sweeping
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that a particular law firm fails to supervise its associates may be
perceived by clients, not merely as an "uneventful" ethical trans-
gression, but as a quality control issue. Many clients may choose to
select law firms on the basis of quality of work product as evi-
denced by a firm's commitment to its duties of supervision.24'
Potential clients may be dissuaded from retaining law firms whose
legal work product has been placed in question by a public cen-
sure. By raising the specter of unreliability of legal work-product
due to a lack of associate supervision, clients might seek repre-
sentation from a "supervising" law firm. Thus, the potential of
adverse publicity as reflective of the quality of a firm's legal servic-
changes to create a leaner and meaner state disciplinary machine." Changes Sought to
Streamline California Disciplinay System, [10 Current Reports] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 294-95 (Oct. 5, 1994) (emphasis added). The Committee, chaired by Arthur
Alarcon, a Ninth Circuit senior justice, presented the recommendations to the state bar
on August 29, 1994. Id. at 295. One such proposal recognizes the importance of entity
responsibility.
In order to put more bite behind the disciplinary system's bark, the committee
recommended that the law firm affiliation of a sanctioned attorney be published,
along with whether or not the lawyer has ended that affiliation. Identification of
the law firm would not be unfair, the committee suggested, and would help to
end the misapprehension that only solo practitioners are disciplined.
Id. This proposal was considered to be controversial and will be delayed pending further
study.
James E. Towery, a member of the State Bar Board of Governors, is the head of
the task force charged with implementing these recommendations. Id. at 296. He will
present some recommendations to the Board of Governors in late October, 1994, but the
more controversial proposals will be delegated to task forces for further study and will
not be presented to the Board until March, 1995. "[T]he proposal that the lawyer's firm
affiliation be published upon the imposition of discipline proved controversial and was
deferred." Id.
The fact that this proposal was considered controversial suggests the potential value
of adverse law firm publicity as an effective enforcement weapon. If such a proposal is
adopted, law firms would be more seriously motivated to prevent attorney misconduct to
avoid any reputational loss incurred by the negative publicity.
The California proposal does not impose vicarious disciplinary liability on the firm
on the basis of a rule violation by a firm attorney, nor does it impose direct disciplinary
liability on the firm for violation of a firm-directed rule. On the other hand, while the
California proposal neither vicariously nor directly targets the firm on either of these
bases, it may nevertheless be equally effective in motivating firms to prevent misconduct
by imposing the burden and reputational threat of this indirect form of "associational"
disciplinary responsibility. What Professor Schneyer, the New York Report, and this article
are ultimately attempting to do through direct "substantive" proposals might be substan-
tially accomplished through California's indirect "procedural" proposal.
241 See Schneyer, supra note 26, at 12-13 (noting that firms could compete for clients
by standing on their ethical track records, and that ethical attorneys would be encour-




es should motivate firms in the private sector to comply with firm-
directed supervisory rules.
Although a method of effective enforcement is integral to a
system of law firm discipline, debate should focus on the under-
lying merits, at least for the time being.242 Imposing responsibili-
ty on the firm as a whole to institute reasonable supervisory mea-
sures is a sensible approach to achieving preventive goals, even in
the face of enforcement difficulties and uncertainties. As the New
York Report explains:
The Code has always contained some Disciplinary Rules which
are not often enforced by disciplinary sanction." But the Dis-
ciplinary Rules are about more than practical enforceability. We
firmly believe that the vast majority of lawyers seek to comply
with Disciplinary Rules because they are in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and independent of the actual threat of discipline.
Indeed, this notion is at the heart of a system of self-regula-
tion. We believe that the vast majority of lawyers want to act
ethically. The function of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility is to help them do so. In our view, the instructive func-
tion served by the Disciplinary Rules is more important to the
profession than is the fact that the Rules are used as a basis
for discipline. As we have stated, the function of the proposed
amendments is to help law firms avoid civil and other liability
by requiring them to improve firm-wide practices and proce-
dures. 2 4
The thrust of this comment is that the bar should be assisting
firms in achieving professionalism in practice, irrespective of the
threat of discipline. One way the bar could do so is by taking a
proactive approach to regulation, especially toward a policy goal of
prevention through supervision.
VI. PROACTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF SUPERVISORY DUTIES
Although encouraging law firms to embrace supervisory duties
through fear of disciplinary exposure is a necessary component of
242 "[T]he process of turning the [New York] report into ethics rules could take
years and its major value right now 'is to get the bar discussing the important ideas it
contains.'" Reske, supra note 29, at 32 (quoting New York University School of Law Pro-
fessor Stephen Gillers).
243 NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 27, at 643 n.14 (citing an attorney's duty to report
another attorney's misconduct as an example of a Disciplinary Rule which has rarely
resulted in the imposition of sanctions). See supra note 170.
244 Id. at 643.
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the regulatory process, it is also arguably reactive and punitive.
Undoubtedly, firms will increase their supervisory and monitoring
efforts to avoid disciplinary sanctions. Yet, fear-induced supervision
might create defensively initiated measures meeting bare minimum
disciplinary standards. Moreover, without proactive efforts, regula-
tion is largely accomplished on a case by case punitive basis re-
sulting in a piecemeal body of common (disciplinary) law defining
reasonable efforts and adequate supervisory measures within the
meaning of compliance with Model Rule 5.1. A spotty45 case by
case disciplinary approach uses precious bar resources, takes time
to develop and assumes the effectiveness of a general deterrence
theory. Beyond the shortcomings of a purely reactive and punitive
approach, punishing individual attorneys, firms, or both, as a
"compliance through fear" mechanism deepens an "us against
them" regulatory climate and represses any genuine sense of self-
regulation. Thus, this section of the article advocates that the bar
proactively promote supervisory duties outside of any disciplinary
context. Proactive bar efforts promote the spirit and achieve the
preventive goals underlying Rule 5.1. By expanding the bar's activi-
ties in this manner, the legal profession embraces genuine self-
regulation.
This proactive approach requests that firms make a good faith
self-analysis of their supervisory measures that reasonably ensure
lawyers at the firm conform to the rules of ethical conduct. A
firm's heightened awareness of its ethical environment resulting
from its own evaluation is a valuable step toward true self-regula-
tion. Through this ethical self-analysis, a firm would consider not
only the ways in which it attempts to prevent problems, but would
also consider ways in which the firm deals, directly and indirectly,
with problems which have occurred or which might occur. Directly
confronting these issues raises them to a conscious level, leading
the firm to reevaluate practice methods which may have become
routine and unquestioned.
Rule 5.1 constitutes a pure prophylactic rule requiring preven-
tive measures aimed at the initial prevention of any misconduct.
245 The spotty development of interpretive disciplinary law has been observed. At
least twenty-four jurisdictions do not even publish an opinion in all discipline cases.
MCKAY REPORT, supra note 6, at 47. "The failure of courts, state discipline boards, and
hearing committees to publish opinions results in a lack of precedent to guide the bar
and in a failure of disciplinary law to develop." Id. Even published cases often fail to
specify the full reasoning behind the sanctions. "The lack of articulated reasons for im-
posing particular sanctions results in a lack of guidance to the bar . . . ." Id.
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Neither the letter nor the spirit of Rule 5.1 requires the actual
occurrence, knowledge or suspicion of professional misconduct
within a firm as a prerequisite to triggering supervisory duties. Its
application, however, realistically comes into play, if ever, only
after misconduct has occurred within the firm. It is likely that. too
few disciplinary opinions would be generated to prompt firms to
compare their own supervisory efforts with those that failed to
meet minimum standards, as discussed in those disciplinary opin-
ions.24 Relying solely on discipline means the preventive, prophy-
lactic intent underlying Rule 5.1 is substantially lost. By asking
firms and supervisory attorneys to evaluate in advance of any prob-
lems, the preventive measures in effect, the reasonable efforts that
are made, and their implementation procedures, provides an op-
portunity for firms to evaluate hidden assumptions and make ap-
propriate changes where necessary. A law firm's efforts in this re-
gard, done outside of any disciplinary forum or threat, would
significantly advance the preventive purposes behind the supervi-
sory duties.
Aside from the fear of exposure to disciplinary sanctions,
inducing a firm to conduct this ethical self-examination in good
faith can be accomplished. A simple compliance reporting system
which requires firms periodically to report to the bar their super-
visory procedures and efforts accomplishes this proactive approach
to self-regulation. 4 Firms' reports to the bar would necessitate
their conscious attention to preventive strategies.2" This proactive
approach accomplishes several goals: (1) firms would recognize
the importance of their supervisory measures and efforts as a valu-
able tool in preventing misconduct; (2) firms would use the com-
pliance reporting opportunity to review their formal and informal
supervisory measures and efforts; (3) the bar sends an important
message to the profession about the importance of attorneys' and
firms' roles in effective and true self-regulation; (4) as the bar
246 See supra Part III.D; note 245 and accompanying text.
247 For an example of a successful, proactive prophylactic measure in the specific
area of client trust funds, see MCKAY REPORT, supra note 6, at 58-56 (noting that state
regulations involving trust account overdraft notification, record-keeping and random
audit rules have proven effective in deterring misconduct involving client trust funds and
further noting that "[riather than being a regulatory burden on honest practitioners,
these requirements have instead provided useful guidance on proper accounting proce-
dures.").
248 See Spaeth, supra note 35, at 1234 (advocating that requiring reports would cause
lawyers to institute internal monitoring procedures and would assist the bar in enforcing
Model Rule 5.1).
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gathers information about ways in which different types and sizes
of firms internally monitor for ethical compliance, the bar could
disseminate information about firms' collective experiences; and
(5) the bar could review individual firms' measures against accept-
ed standards and offer guidance in advance of problems.
24
1
Although proactive self-regulation of this type might be op-
posed by some law firms as being intrusive," a simple reporting
system asks firms to do no more than describe how they comply
with the absolute and affirmative duty under Rule 5.1. 1 Consid-
ering the value to the profession, law firms should not consider
submission of a report regarding their Rule 5.1 compliance meth-
ods to be heavy-handed onerous over-regulation. 2 Arguably, the
form of the report is immaterial. It could be in narrative form, a
bar supplied form, or embodied in a firm operating and proce-
dures manual. A significant benefit would be realized simply be-
cause attorneys with managerial responsibilities would consciously
consider the affirmative duty and its application in their firms.
The intrusion is minimal, the benefits are real, and the burden is
a small price to pay for the privilege of self-regulation.
Establishing an effective prevention/supervisory program need
not be a guessing game for law firms, nor should it be. Proper
methods for complying with Model Rule 5.1, however, remain
vague to law firms as well as to disciplinary agencies.2" The lan-
249 See Schneyer, supra note 26, at 31 (suggesting the bar could proceed against those
firms "whose reports reveal clear inadequacies" and explaining that "[i]f firm infrastruc-
ture is clearly deficient, a disciplinary agency should no more wait for harm to result
than the police should wait for a driver with obviously poor brakes to hit someone be-
fore stopping him.").
Although reviewing and evaluating each firm's report might not be practically possi-
ble, the requirement of a report would require law firm introspection and achieve valu-
able self-evaluation for the firm. The report, even in the absence of the bar's review of
it, is beneficial. See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
250 The bar's scrutiny and a law firm's report of its Rule 5.1 techniques might be
expensive and intrusive. Schneyer, supra note 23, at 948. Nevertheless, mandatory firm re-
ports would not be nearly as intrusive as other regulatory methods such as a lawyer peer
review program. Schneyer, supra note 26, at 41 n.247.
251 A law firm's opposition to describing how it complies with an existing affirmative
ethical duty is itself troubling.
252 By comparison, Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirements
have been adopted in most states, many of which require individual attorneys to do
much more than file a report. By mid-1992, 38 states had imposed MCLE requirements.
MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 37, at 310. Although MCLE requirements are intended to
maintain the competency of attorneys, there is little evidence regarding that effect. Id. at
311. See supra Part II.
253 In discussing the monitoring requirements imposed by Rule 5.1, Professor
Schneyer explains: "At present, the 'efforts' necessary and the measures that would, give
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guage of Model Rule 5.1 is drafted around a standard of reason-
ableness. The official Comments provide minimal guidance2
and the few existing disciplinary opinions primarily describe super-
visory failures - what not to do, rather than describing model or
workable supervisory programs. 5
The bar can help eliminate uncertainties about supervisory
obligations by providing guidelines describing reasonable super-
visory measures under Rule 5.1. Such guidelines would assist firms
in implementing programs designed to accomplish the underlying
intent. A more detailed description of Rule 5.1 compliance sugges-
tions will encourage firms and supervisory attorneys to institute
concrete programs to reduce or avoid any disciplinary responsi-
bility for an attorney's misconduct. In any disciplinary proceeding,
the firm's "Supervisory Program," as reported to the bar, could
serve as a starting place for determining the firm's potential disci-
plinary exposure.
In conjunction with suggestions and recommendations from
all segments of the practicing bar, the bar could develop and
promulgate "Supervisory Guidelines" that describe standards, some
broad and some appropriately specific, for compliance with super-
visory obligations. The Supervisory Guidelines provided by the bar
would primarily facilitate a law firm's efforts in establishing .an
effective Supervisory Program. The Supervisory Guidelines would
serve as a resource for a law firm's self-analysis and assist the firm
in preparing its periodic report to the bar. Mandating specific su-
pervisory details within Rule 5.1 (as a matter of discipline) would
be inappropriate micro-managing, not only because of its intrusive-
ness into law firm governance, but also because it fails to appreci-
ate the differences in firms' circumstances.26
Supervisory Guidelines need not carry the weight of a disci-
plinary rule in order to be effective. A firm's disciplinary exposure
for inadequate supervision could still be determined by the broad-
er "reasonable" standard currently contained in Model Rule 5.1.
The New York Report's recommended addition to DR 1-104 of
New York's Code of Professional Responsibility (New York's coun-
'reasonable assurance' are largely anyone's gtqess." Schneyer, supra note 26, at 17.
254 See supra Parts ILA.-C.
255 See supra note 76; Part III.D.
256 While specific requirements would give firms notice of their precise obligations,
few of the requirements would likely be appropriate for all firms. Schneyer, supra note
26, at 27-28.
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terpart to Rule 5.1) serves as an example of providing specific
guidance for complying with the rule while retaining the broader
"adequate" or "reasonable" supervision standard for disciplinary
purposes.z 7
Differences in law firm structure, size, specialties and other
law firm characteristics would not make Supervisory Guidelines
useless. The operative provisions of the current requirements of
Model Rule 5.1 ("reasonable efforts" and "measures giving reason-
able assurance") can be made more meaningful in a practical
setting through broadly drafted guidelines describing an effective
program from conceptual and practical perspectives. Individual
firms can evaluate the suitability and value of various Supervisory
Guidelines as they relate to a firm's unique characteristics. In this
way, Supervisory Guidelines would provide instructive information
for each individual firm to consider adopting. Each firm's con-
sciously considered and individually tailored Preven-
tion/Supervisory Program, as periodically reported to the bar,
would immeasurably assist in achieving the underlying prophylactic
goals of Model Rule 5.1.
A firm's Prevention/Supervisory Program would also operate
to inform supervising attorneys of their specific obligations and ar-
eas of responsibility to identified subordinate attorneys. Concrete
firm policies and procedures will replace vague notions of supervi-
sory duties. Actual methods and procedures for implementation by
individual supervising attorneys will result. Thus, individual super-
vising attorneys will know what is expected of them and how to
fulfill the firm's expectations for the supervision of their subordi-
nate attorneys.
Perhaps even more important than a supervising attorney's
understanding of the firm's expectations of him or her is the
awareness by subordinate attorneys of what they should and can
expect in the way of being supervised. When subordinate attorneys
are aware, in advance, of overall firm policies and understand the
role of their supervising attorneys, subordinate attorneys can facili-
257 See supra note 224 and accompanying text (stating the proposed rule). While the
law firm "shall adequately supervise . . . [t]he degree of supervision required is that which
is reasonable under the circumstances." NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 27, at 638 (empha-
sis added). The proposed rule provides what might be considered "Supervisory Guide-
lines" in that it suggests: (1) factors to take into consideration, such as experience of
subordinate and the likelihood that ethical problems will arise; (2) specific areas for
review, such as work product and billing practices; and (3) the scope of supervision, such
as review of associates' and partners' work. Id.
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tate the supervisory process. Subordinate attorneys will be less
hesitant to seek guidance and assistance from their supervisors if
they know that supervision of subordinates has been consciously
adopted and concretely transformed into law firm policy and
made a defined responsibility of identified supervisory lawyers.
Advance understanding by subordinates of consciously adopted
supervisory procedures in the firm should reduce the subordinate's
natural hesitancy to approach his or her supervisor. The subordi-
nate will actually be assisting the supervisor in fulfilling his or her
duties as defined by the firm. Over time, supervising attorneys'
fulfillment of the firm's explicit expectations, coupled with subor-
dinate attorneys' conscious efforts to have their supervisory needs
and expectations met, will become the organizational culture.
Eventually, these practices will become the norm throughout the
profession.
The bar's goal of preventing misconduct can be accomplished
by proactive means outside of any disciplinary context. This kind
of approach is particularly suitable for ethical rules unmistakably
designed with a prophylactic purpose. The duty of reasonable
supervisory responsibility illustrates such a rule. The bar's publish-
ing of "Supervisory Guidelines" would aid firms in developing their
customized "Supervisory/Prevention Program." Firms' periodic
reporting to the bar will increase compliance in firms, thereby
preventing misconduct in an ethical and collaborative setting.
VII. CONCLUSION-PREVENTING ATTORNEY MIscoNDUur
The short-term prospects for achieving genuine self-regulation
in the legal profession are bright. An important starting point in
attaining a meaningful notion of self-regulation begins by recogniz-
ing that behind the ultimate concern of the attorney/client rela-
tionship lies a supervising attorney/subordinate attorney relation-
ship. In a broader sense, the ethical environment of the law firm
as a whole is implicated. Preventing misconduct by promoting
attorneys' supervisory duties fosters this ethical law firm atmo-
sphere.
The long-term prospects are even brighter. Subordinate attor-
neys will be influenced by the positive role-model of supervision
and guidance they experienced and enjoyed. One day they will
become supervisory attorneys who will in turn provide positive
role-modeling for their subordinates; the cycle perpetuates. Fulfill-
ing supervisory duties helps create this collaborative setting, which
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produces a new generation of even more ethically conscious attor-
neys. Genuine self-regulation of the legal profession involves not
just being accountable for one's own professional conduct today; it
also requires accepting responsibility for tomorrow by mentoring
and nurturing the next generation.
This article began with a quotation from a disciplinary opin-
ion expressing concern that the whole "sorry episode" of attorney
misconduct could have been prevented had the "young attorney
received the collegial support and guidance expected of supervis-
ing attorneys."' The court cautioned the profession that an atti-
tude of leaving new lawyers to "sink or swim" would not be toler-
ated in the future. Although the warning was issued ten years ago,
it remains a promising ideal. The legal profession can begin enjoy-
ing the court's vision of the future by embracing a policy goal of
preventing misconduct by promoting the ethics of attorneys' super-
visory duties.
258 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 70:2
